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DEEP TRACKS: ALBUM CUTS THAT
HELP DEFINE THE ESSENTIAL SCALIA
Gary Lawson*

-

Jeff Sutton and Ed Whelan have collected some of Justice Scalia's
"greatest hits" in a volume entitled The Essential Scalia: On the
Constitution, the Courts, and the Rule of Law. The book is an
excellent introduction to the jurisprudential thought and literary
style of one of the most influential legal thinkers - and legal writers
in modern times. As with any "greatest hits" compilation, however,
there are inevitably going to be key "album cuts" for which there will
not be space. This essay seeks to supplement Sutton and Whelan's
invaluable efforts by surveying three of those "deep tracks" that shed
particular light on Justice Scalia's contributions to legal thought. The
first opinion, a lone concurring opinion in NLRB v. Int'l Brotherhoodof
Electrical Workers Local 340, dates from Justice Scalia's first term on
the Court and illuminates his interpretative methodology, his
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jurisprudential focus, and his unique take on precedent. The second
opinion, Zuni Public School Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Education, is a
dissent by Justice Scalia that may exemplify his approach to statutory
interpretation better than any other decision, if only by way of

contrast between his approach and that of other justices. The third
opinion, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, starkly pitted Justice Scalia
against a phalanx of conventionally labeled "conservative" justices
(aligned with Justice Breyer) on one of the most impactful
constitutional questions to reach the Supreme Court in recent
decades. It sharply highlights the key, and oft overlooked, ambiguity
regarding what it means to be a conservative jurist and a
constitutionalist jurist. Collectively, these opinions show how, in
order to understand some of the most important currents in modern
law, one needs the essential Scalia - and The Essential Scalia.
INTRODUCTION

Assembling a "greatest hits" album for a musical artist is often a
tricky proposition, especially if the compilation aims to encourage
listeners to explore more of the artist's work and get a better sense of
the artist's trajectory and impact. If the hit singles or other songs
included as "greatest hits" are not really representative of the artist's
catalogue, there are twin dangers of disappointment if the listeners
venture further only to discover that the album cuts are wildly
different from the hits and lost opportunities if the listeners don't
bother to try out the studio albums, concluding that they adequately
"know" the artist just from listening to the compiled hit singles.

Some artists lend themselves better than others to selective
compilation. For example, one of the top-selling albums of all time is
Their Greatest Hits, 1971-1975 by The Eagles,' collecting the singles

1THE EAGLES, THEIR GREATEST HITS, 1971-1975 (Asylum 1976). By some measures,
the album might rank as high as #2 in all-time sales (behind Michael Jackson's
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from The Eagles' first four studio albums. While there are certainly
some gems from those studio albums that did not make the
compilation, 2 the Greatest Hits album fairly represents the work
product of The Eagles during the relevant time span. Someone who
listens to the album will get a good sense of the group's sound and
style; and if that listener likes the songs assembled on the GreatestHits
package, he or she is probably going to like the studio albums as well.
There is not a dramatic difference in the sound or tone of the album
cuts and the singles -though in terms of songwriting quality, the
singles were generally chosen as singles for good reasons.
For other artists, however, a representative "greatest hits"
compilation seems entirely out of the question. Just consider, for
example, what a "greatest hits" album would look (or sound) like for
Pink Floyd or Rush. For one thing, some of those artists' finest work
is simply too long- on more than rare occasions encompassing entire
album sides 3 -for inclusion in an introductory compilation. For
another thing, the songs often lose something important by being
removed from the context of the studio albums from whence they
came; some songs work best when they are part of a coherent whole.

matchless Thriller). See WIKIPEDIA, List of Best-Selling Albums [https:/ /perma.cc/5VC59TGB].
2My list of missing gems would include "Ol' 55," "After the Thrill Is Gone," and
"Journey of the Sorcerer" (the latter if only because of The Hitchhiker's Guide to the
Galaxy). Many Eagles fans will scream "James Dean." It's not among my favorites, but
I won't argue the point.
3 Hear, e.g., PINK FLOYD, Echoes, MEDDLE (Harvest 1971); RUSH, The Fountain of

Lamneth, CARESS OF STEEL (Mercury 1975); RUSH, 2112, 2112 (Anthem 1976); RUSH,
Cygnus X-1 Book II: Hemispheres,HEMISPHERES (Anthem 1978). There are also must-hear
tracks from those two bands that do not consume entire album sides but exceed ten

minutes in length, which probably makes them poor choices for a "greatest hits"
compilation. Hear, e.g., PINK FLOYD, A Saucerful of Secrets, A SAUCERFUL OF SECRETS

(EMI Columbia 1968); PINK FLOYD, Shine On You Crazy Diamond (PartsI-V) & Shine On
You Crazy Diamond (Parts VI-IX), WISH You WERE HERE (Harvest 1975); PINK FLOYD,
Pigs (Three Different Ones), ANIMALS (Harvest 1977); RUSH, Xanadu, A FAREWELL TO

KINGS (Anthem 1977); RUSH, Cygnus X-1 Book I: The Voyage, A FAREWELL TO KINGS
(Anthem 1977). (Note to Rush fans: "Natural Science," from the stellar and underrated

PermanentWaves album, is not quite ten minutes long, so it did not make my arbitrary
cut-off for this footnote.)
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And, finally, those artists' work product is simply too diverse to be

effectively captured by any kind of compilation. That is true of other
artists as well; Led Zeppelin here leaps to mind as a prime example
of a band with so many different sounds that it is hard to see how a
limited compilation would work well. It is no accident that there has

never been a successful "greatest hits" album for any of these bands.
Now, suppose that you have to assemble for an artist a "greatest
hits" compilation that contains only excerpts from the songs. You can

only present perhaps one verse and one chorus, and maybe one brief
instrumental bridge, from any single work. For artists with complex
works, it will be close to impossible under those constraints to put
together anything even faintly representative of the artist's career.
Try to imagine, for example, a collection of snippets from songs by
Yes. It simply won't work.
Jeff Sutton and Ed Whelan faced all of these potential problems
and more in trying to compile Antonin Scalia's greatest hits for The

Essential Scalia: On the Constitution, the Courts, and the Rule of Law. 4 Not
even counting his fifteen years in the legal academy and the federal

executive department, Judge and then Justice Scalia produced almost
three and half decades' worth of opinions, speeches, articles, and
books. The range of subjects covered by that massive work product
is staggering, spanning the worlds of legal and political theory. Much
of that work product is Yes-like in its length and complexity, many
of Justice Scalia's writings are Rush-like in their subtlety and
technical prowess, and the catalogue as a whole has a Zeppelin-like
feel of diversity and breadth. Even more importantly, Justice Scalia
rightly prided himself on analytical precision and rigor. Accordingly,
his works typically build arguments logically from premises to
conclusions. When the chains of reasoning have any significant

length, trying to excerpt the arguments is necessarily going to leave

4 Antonin Scalia, THE ESSENTIAL SCALIA: ON THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND
THE RULE OF LAW Jeffrey S. Sutton & Edward Whelan eds., 2020) [hereinafter The
Essential Scalia].
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out something important, even when those excerpts have a good
measure of stand-alone merit. One can absolutely listen to David
5
Gilmour's magnificent guitar solo from "Comfortably Numb" or
Jimmy Page's legendary blast on "Stairway to Heaven" 6 and
appreciate them as self-contained bits of musical genius, but surely
something is lost if that is all that one hears from those songs.
Similarly, Justice Scalia's writings contain a plethora of memorable
passages with enduring merit, both literary and substantive, but
those passages lose something when taken out of the context of the
larger arguments in which they were embedded.
Even to attempt to capture the true scope of Justice Scalia's
thought would require at least the equivalent of a multi-album boxed
set, probably spanning half a dozen or more lengthy volumes. If the
goal is to introduce people to Justice Scalia's thought, that is not an
option. No one unfamiliar with Yes is going to listen to the four-CD
Yesyears 7 as their first exposure, and no one unfamiliar with Justice
Scalia's writings will sit down and read a six-volume series of 500page books. Accordingly, Jeff Sutton and Ed Whelan took on the
Herculean tasks of (a) picking out a subset of Justice Scalia's works
to include in an edited volume and (b) choosing excerpts or snippets
from those works that convey the most important elements of Justice
Scalia's substantive and literary styles.

So how did they fare?
Pretty darned well, all things considered. If I were trying to slot
Justice Scalia into the world of classic rock, I would probably
analogize him to Rush or Yes, given the elegance, intricacy, and
8
sophistication of his thought and writing. This makes an effective
"greatest hits" compilation of Justice Scalia's work product close to
impossible. But given those constraints, Sutton and Whelan have

5 Hear PINK FLOYD, Comfortably Numb, THE WALL (Harvest 1979).
6 Hear LED ZEPPELIN, Stairway to Heaven, [UNTITLED FOURTH ALBUM] (Atlantic 1971).
7 YES, YESYEARS (Atco 1991).

8It is not at all a coincidence that Rush and Yes would both easily make my list of
top five all-time artists, just as Justice Scalia would easily make my list of top five alltime legal theorists.
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done about as good a job as is humanly possible of picking out the
most important themes in Justice Scalia's work and his most
noteworthy and memorable pieces of writing.
The key to their handling of the material is the organization. They
have sorted the material by topic, moving (roughly speaking) from
the most abstract ideas ("The Rule of Law," "Originalism,"
"Textualism") to relatively abstract applications of those principles
("Constitutional Structure") to more particularistic applications
("Review of Agency Action"). That was a wise choice of structure; it
is hard to understand Justice Scalia's specific opinions or comments

without seeing the wider interpretative and jurisprudential context
from which they spring. Because my tastes run more to the abstract
than to the particular, I would have liked to have seen a bit more
emphasis placed on the higher-level material on originalism and
textualism, but that is a quibble that likely says more about me than
about Sutton, Whelan, or Justice Scalia. For anyone who wants an
introduction to, or perhaps a refresher in, Justice Scalia's enormous
contributions to and influence on modern legal thought, this volume
is a terrific place to start.
Indeed, rather than critique the volume, which would involve
nothing more dramatic or intellectually interesting than some
additional idiosyncratic quibbles, my goal here is to supplement it.
When dealing with an artist with the breadth and longevity of a
Justice Scalia, even a comprehensive compilation is going to miss
some deep-tracks gems. Accordingly, I want to highlight here three
opinions authored by Justice Scalia which-quite understandablydid not make the cut for The Essential Scalia but which each say
something important about Justice Scalia's approach to law and
adjudication. They do so as much by contrast with the approaches of
other people as by Justice Scalia's exposition of his own views, and it
was therefore entirely reasonable for Sutton and Whelan to exclude
them from the "greatest hits" volume that was intended to showcase
Justice Scalia in a more direct fashion. These opinions are truly album
cuts, but they are album cuts that say a great deal about Justice
Scalia's artistry.
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The first opinion, a lone concurring opinion in NLRB v. Int'l

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 340,9 dates from Justice Scalia's
first term on the Court, and it illuminates his interpretative
methodology, his jurisprudential focus, and his unique take on

precedent. The second opinion, Zuni Public School Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't
of Education,10 features a dissent by Justice Scalia that may exemplify
his approach to statutory interpretation better than any other
decision, if only by way of contrast between his approach and that of

other justices. The third opinion, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,"
starkly pitted Justice Scalia against a phalanx of conventionally
labeled "conservative" justices (aligned with Justice Breyer) on one
of the most impactful constitutional questions to reach the Supreme
Court in recent decades. It sharply highlights the key, and oft
overlooked, ambiguity regarding what it means to be a conservative
jurist and a constitutionalistjurist.1 2
Whether one mostly agrees or mostly disagrees with Justice
Scalia, there is no denying his enormous influence on jurisprudence;

he is a topic well worth studying and as fit a subject for a "greatest
hits" collection as one will find in the legal world. As a matter of full
disclosure: I clerked for Justice Scalia twice, including during his first
term on the Supreme Court in 1986-87, and it is no great secret that I
fall into the "mostly agrees" camp. It is also no great secret (since I
have said so in print on multiple occasions) that there are important

9481 U.S. 573 (1987).
10550 U.S. 81 (2007).
11557 U.S. 305 (2009).
1 2 Another good candidate for inclusion as a missing deep track, which illuminates
some of the same themes as Melendez-Diaz, is Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
That decision has been discussed at length elsewhere. See, e.g., George Kannar, The
Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297 (1990); Gary Lawson,

Confronting Crawford: Justice Scalia, the Judicial Method, and the Adjudicative Limits of
Originalism,84 U. CHI. L. REV. 2265 (2017); Timothy MacDonnell, Justice Scalia's Fourth
Amendment: Text, Context, Clarity, and Occasional Faint-Hearted Originalism, 3 VA. J.
CRIM. L. 175, 184-88 (2015).

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty

176

New York University Journal of Law & Liberty

[Vol. 15:169

aspects of his jurisprudence with which I vigorously disagree. 13 But
in this review essay, I come neither to praise nor to bury Justice Scalia
but rather to help understand him and his place in legal thought by
building on the impressive foundation laid by Sutton and Whelan in
their invaluable volume.
I. "CAUSE THAT UNION MAN'S GOT SUCH A HOLD OVER ME.
HE'S THE MAN WHO DECIDES IF I LIVE OR I DIE, IF I STARVE,
OR I EAT"14

It is fair to describe Justice Scalia's 1987 concurring opinion in
NLRB v. Int'l Brotherhood of ElectricalWorkers, Local 34015 as "obscure."
I do not believe the opinion has ever been cited in a subsequent
Supreme Court decision; I know of only one lower court decision that
mentions it;16 and slightly more than a dozen law review articles cite
it, only one of which contains a significant textual discussion of
Justice Scalia's expressed views in that case. 17 That neglect is
unfortunate, because the brief but powerful concurring opinion

provides important insight into Justice Scalia's jurisprudential
approach, especially with respect to the relative roles of text and
precedent in adjudication. This opinion is thus, as the late great Tom
Petty might have put it, a buried treasure.

13 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, DidJustice Scalia Have a Theory of Interpretation?,92 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 2143 (2017); Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Rule of Law as a Law
of Law, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 483 (2015); Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The
Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response
to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002 (2007). I disagreed with Justice Scalia even
more vigorously and broadly on many questions of political theory and morality, but
those subjects are beyond the scope of this essay.
14 THE KiNKS, Get Back in Line, LOLA VERSUS POWERMAN AND THE MONEYGOROUND,

PART ONE (Reprise 1970).
15 481 U.S. 573 (1987).
16 See Critical Mass Energy Product v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871,
881-82 (Randolph, J.,
concurring) (en banc).
17 See Anne Marie Lofaso, Justice Scalia's Labor Jurisprudence - Justice Denied?, 21
EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 13, 55-57 (2017).

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty

2021]

DEEP TRAcKS: ALBUM CUTS THAT HELP DEFINE THE ESSENTIAL SCALIA

177

The case involved a provision added by the Taft-Hartley Act in
1947 to the federal labor laws as section 8(b)(1)(B) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 18 declaring: "It shall be an unfair labor practice
for a labor organization or its agents - (1) to restrain or coerce ... (B)
an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes
of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances."19 Unions,
in other words, do not get a say in who employers choose as their

bargaining representatives. Operationally, unions cannot use
coercive powers to force employers into multi-employer bargaining
units or into choosing as representatives persons who the unions
20
think will be favorable to their positions. While it is not self-evident
what it means to "restrain or coerce" an employer in this context, it is
self-evident that the only subject matter of the prohibition is
interference with the employer's "selection of his representatives for
the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of

grievances." 21
The constitution of the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers Union provides, and provided in 1982, that Union members
may be penalized for "[w]orking for, or on behalf of, any employer
22
... whose position is adverse or detrimental to the I.B.E.W." In
1982, the Union, under this provision, fined three of its members for
working for employers who did not have collective bargaining
agreements with the Union and who paid wages below the Union's
fixed scale. The employers-not the fined Union members, but the
employers-filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) under section 8(b)(1)(B), claiming that
the fines imposed on the employees "restrain[ed] or coerce[d]" the

18 Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
19

§ 158(b)(1)(B) (1947).

29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (1947).

20 See 481 U.S. at 580 ("This section was enacted to prevent a union from exerting

direct pressure on an employer to force it into a multiemployer bargaining unit or to
dictate its choice of representatives for the settlement of employee grievances.").
2129 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
22 Int'l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers Const. and Rules for Local Unions and

Councils Under Its Jurisdiction (Sept. 2016), art. XXI, § 1(f). [https://perma.cc/FTB8FT2X].
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employers in their selection of bargaining representatives. The NLRB
found that two of the three employees were functioning as
supervisors for their employers when they were fined? 3 The agency
also found, and no one disputed, that in 1982 the employers had no
collective bargaining agreement with the Union. In other words, the
fined Union members who were working as supervisors for the
employers had no collective bargaining or grievance adjustment
dealings with the IBEW local that fined them.
If one is at all a devotee of plain meaning in statutory
interpretation, it is difficult to see how a provision aimed at
prohibiting unions from coercing employers in the selection of

representatives "for the purposes of collective bargaining or the
adjustment of grievances" could be implicated by union discipline of
a member who cannot possibly have a collective bargaining or
grievance adjustment role with respect to that union because there is
no union/employer relationship over which to bargain or grieve.
One might also think that "restrain" and "coerce" are active verbs,
connoting some kind of direct link between the prohibited union
action and the employer's selection process. So, how could internal
union discipline of a member who worked for an employer with
whom the union had no dealings find its way to the NLRB, much less
result in an unfair labor practice ruling?

If one looks only at the text of section 8(b)(1)(B), the result is
wholly implausible. As it happens, however, the NLRB before 1982
had already given the statutory provision at issue a very broad
interpretation. If one starts with those interpretations rather than
with the statute, the employers' case starts to look much better. The
story of the evolution of the NLRB's take on this statute is long and
twisted, but it is necessary context for understanding Justice Scalia's

23

See Int'l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, 271 N.L.R.B. 995. 996-98 (1984). The third

employee sometimes functioned as a supervisor for the employer but was found to be
working solely as a rank-and-file electrician during the events giving rise to the Union

discipline. See id. at 1000-01.
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brief but potent statements in Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
Local 340.
The first step came in 1968, when the NLRB concluded that union
attempts to influence or control the performance of an employer-

selected representative's collective bargaining or grievance
adjustment functions could constitute an attempt to "restrain or
24
The theory in this
coerce . . . the selection" of representatives.
have little choice
would
employers
that
Oakland Mailers decision was
but to replace a representative if a union effectively controlled that
person's decisions through internal disciplinary measures, so that the
employer was not really then allowed to select whomever it chose.

The NLRB explained:
Respondent's actions, including the citations, fines, and

threats of citation, were designed to change the Charging
Party's

representatives

viewpoint

from

of management

persons

representing

to persons responsive

the

or

subservient to Respondent's will. In enacting Section
8(b)(1)(B) Congress sought to prevent the very evil involved
herein-union interference with an employer's control over
its own representatives. That Respondent may have sought
the substitution of attitudes rather than persons, and may
have exerted its pressures upon the Charging Party by
indirect rather than direct means, cannot alter the ultimate
fact that pressure was exerted here for the purpose of
interfering with the Charging Party's control over its
representatives. Realistically, the Employer would have to
replace its foremen or face de facto nonrepresentation by
them. In all the circumstances, therefore, we find that
Respondent's acts constitute restraint and coercion of the

24 See San Francisco-Oakland Mailers' Union No. 18, 172 N.L.R.B. 2173 (1968).
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Charging Party in the selection of its representatives within
the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act.25

Although control of a representative's action is not literally the same
thing as control of an employer's selection of a representative, which is
the only subject directly addressed by the statute, the NLRB's
decision is at least understandable. To be sure, one could perfectly
well construe section 8(b)(1)(B) to apply only to direct attempts to
affect the selection process, as the NLRB construed it for quite some
time. 26 But, one could also construe the term "representatives" to
have a functional, and not merely formal, meaning so that the statute
protects not just a bare right to choose a person, but also the right to
have that person act, in fact as well as form, as the employer's agent.
Union efforts to coerce agents in the performance of their unionrelated activities could thus be seen indirectly to coerce the
employer's selection of a representative and thus to implicate the
statute. This is not an inevitable construction of the statute, and it is

not even necessarily the best construction of the statute, but it is not
absurd on its face. If one believes in some measure of deference to
agencies in the interpretation of statutes (and such deference to
NLRB interpretations in particular was commonplace even in the
decades before the term "Chevron deference" 27 merited an entry in

2s Id. (footnote omitted).
26 See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Int'l Brotherhood of Elec.
Workers, Local 641,
417 U.S. 790, 798-99 (1974). This construction is supported by the fact that the employer

can always avoid any potential conflict of interest for its representatives by simply
choosing only representatives who are not members of a union. See id. at 807-09.
27 The so-called Chevron doctrine, which prescribes a measure of deference to
agencies in the interpretation of statutes which the agencies administer, is named for
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The
doctrine does not actually stem from the decision for which it is named, but that is a
story for another time. See Gary Lawson & Stephen Kam, Making Law Out of Nothing
At All: The Origins of the Chevron Doctrine, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2013).
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legal dictionaries),2 8 one might well be inclined to let the agency have
this one.
Once that step is taken, the next question is whether a union
"restrain[s] or coerce[s]" the employer in its "selection" of
representatives anytime a union disciplines supervisor/members for
exercising their supervisory power, even when that exercise of power
does not pertain to collective bargaining or grievance adjustment. A
year after Oakland Mailers, the NLRB said yes to that one as well,
calling the statute "a general prohibition of a union's disciplining
supervisor-members for their conduct in the course of representing
29
the interests of their employers." That conclusion is considerably
harder to locate in the language of the statute than was the decision
in Oakland Mailers, since the statutory language deals only with
representation "for the purposes of collective bargaining or the
30
adjustment of grievances." With this ruling, the functional reasons
for giving a broad meaning to the word "representatives" start taking
on a life of their own, divorced from any anchor in the statute. A
perceived purpose of the statutory language becomes the object of
interpretation, rather than the language itself.
If section 8(b)(1)(B) is indeed taken to be "a general prohibition
of a union's disciplining supervisor-members for their conduct in the
course of representing the interests of their employers," how about
union discipline of a supervisor for crossing a picket line to perform
rank-and-file work rather than for exercising supervisory
responsibilities? Does the NLRB's functionally construed (or

28 Indeed, many of the seminal pre-Chevron cases on deference to agency

interpretations of statutes involved the NLRB. See, e.g, Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402
(1941); NLRB v. Hearst, 322 U.S. 111 (1944); Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S.
485 (1947).
29 See Toledo Locals Nos. 15-P & 272, Lithographers & Photoengravers Int'l (Toledo
Blade Co., Inc.), 175 N.L.R.B. 1072, 1080 (1969), enforced NLRB v. Toledo Locals Nos.
15-P & 272, Lithographers & Photo-Engravers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO, 437 F.2d 55 (6th
Cir. 1971).
3029 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B).
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reconstructed?) statute reach even that far? Yep, said the NLRB.31
Nope, said the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision 32 that announced:
We may assume without deciding that the Board's Oakland
Mailers decision fell within the outer limits of this test, but

its decisions in the present cases clearly do not. For it is
certain that these supervisors were not engaged in collective

bargaining or grievance adjustment, or in any activities
related thereto, when they crossed union picket lines during
an economic strike to engage in rank-and-file struck work.3 3
The Court thus drew a line that required some clear connection
between union action and supervisory functions in order to implicate
the statute. Four justices, however, would have deferred to the
NLRB's position, 34 endorsing the statement from a lower court judge
that
"[w]hen a union disciplines a supervisor for crossing a picket
line to perform rank-and-file work at the request of his
employer, that discipline equally interferes with the
employer's control over his representative and equally
deprives him of the undivided loyalty of that supervisor as
in the case where the discipline was imposed because of the

31 See Int'l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers System Council U-4 (Florida Power & Light
Co.), 193 N.L.R.B. 30 (1971); Intl'l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers (Illinois Bell Telephone
Co.), 192 N.L.R.B. 85 (1971).
32
See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Int'l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, Local 641,
417 U.S. 790 (1974).
33Id. at 805.

34 See id. at 816 (White, J., dissenting) ("This Court is not a super-Board authorized
to overrule an agency's choice between reasonable constructions of the controlling

statute. We should not impose our views on the Board as long as it stays within the
outer boundaries of the statute it is charged with administering.").
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way the supervisor interpreted the collective bargaining
35
agreement or performed his 'normal' supervisory duties."

Before Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 340, the last
iteration of this interplay between statutory language and perceived
statutory purposes was American Broadcasting Cos., Inc. v. Writers
36
Guild of America, West, Inc. ("ABC"). A writers' union had struck the
entertainment industry and issued internal orders to its members not
to cross the picket lines. The production companies insisted that
supervisory personnel belonging to the union report to work solely to
perform their supervisory functions, such as grievance adjustment
and occasional collective bargaining negotiations, though not to
perform writing functions that were the subject of the strike. The
union imposed discipline, including fines, on members who reported
to work, which the NLRB found to be a violation of section
8(b)(1)(B).37 Although the union disciplinary action applied across
the board to all strike crossings and did not depend on any factual
findings regarding the exercise of collective bargaining or grievance
functions by the fined employees, the agency concluded that the
union action effectively deprived the employers of the services of
their chosen representatives and thus constituted restraint or
coercion prohibited by section 8(b)(1)(B). The Supreme Court, in
another 5-4 decision, affirmed the NLRB's conclusion, in an opinion
38
dripping with deference to the agency. The Court summarized the
line of authorities from OaklandMailers through FloridaPower & Light
as holding that a violation of the statute occurs from union discipline
of its members

35 Id. at 815 (quoting Int'l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 487 F.2d
1143, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting)).
-437 U.S. 411 (1978).
37
See Writers Guild of America, West, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 957 (1975).

38 The opinion was authored by Justice White, who had written a strong dissent in

FloridaPower & Light Co. urging deference to the NLRB.
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affect

the

supervisor's conduct in his capacity as a grievance adjustor
or collective bargainer. In these situations-that is, when
such impact might be felt - the employer would be deprived
of the full services of his representatives and hence would be
restrained and coerced
representatives.3 9

in

his

selection

of

those

The Court stated that this principle could apply even when the fining
union had no collective bargaining relationship with the employer:
"A union may no more interfere with the employer's choice of a

grievance representative with respect to employees represented by
other unions than with respect to those employees whom it itself
represents."40
The upshot of these decisions is that, circa 1978-1987, unions
could take no action at all against supervisory employees that had
any effect on those employees' ability to perform supervisory
functions for their employers, though they could take action against
supervisors who performed only non-supervisory, rank-and-file
functions. That is quite a lot to draw out of a statutory provision
dealing with employer selection of collective bargaining
representatives, but there you have it.
Such was the doctrine in 1987 when Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, Local 340 reached the Supreme Court. The case before the
NLRB involved union fines of supervisory employees of two
electrical contracting firms. At the time of the fines, which were
imposed for " 'working for an employer who is no longer signatory
to an IBEW agreement with Local Union 340,' "41 neither firm had a
collective bargaining agreement with the union in question; they
were part of a multi-employer bargaining unit that had reached an

39437 U.S. at 429.
40 Id. at 438 n.37.
41 Int'l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, Local 340, 271 N.L.R.B. 995, 998 (1984).
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42
agreement with a different union. The NLRB, adopting in full the
decision of the administrative law judge who heard the case,
summarized the interpretation of section 8(b)(1)(B) that it had
developed over the previous two decades:

It is also well settled that union discipline of supervisormembers who cross a picket line or otherwise violate a
union's no-work rule in order to perform their normal

supervisory functions constitutes indirect union pressure
within the prohibition of Section 8(b)(1)(B). In reaching this
conclusion, the Board and courts have recognized that the
reasonably foreseeable and intended effect of such discipline
is that the supervisor-member will cease working for the
duration of the dispute, thereby depriving the employer of
of his chosen
grievance adjustment services
the

representative. American Broadcasting Companies, supra, at
433-437 fn. 36.... The employer, in such circumstances, must
either replace the disciplined supervisor or risk loss of his
services during a future dispute; in either event, the
employer is coerced in the selection and retention of his
chosen grievance adjustment representative. American
BroadcastingCompanies, supra, 433-437.43
In response to the union's objection that it could not be liable
under section 8(b)(1)(B) because it had no collective bargaining
relationship with the employers,44 the Board concluded that the
Supreme Court's decision in ABC was best read to allow liability,
45
even absent such a relationship. Since the Court in that case had
said that any union action that might induce a supervisor to stop

See id. at 999.
at 1000.
44 See id. at 1001 ("Respondent . .. argues that no violation of Section 8(b)(1)(B) can

42

43Id.

be found because the Union did not have a collective-bargaining agreement or a

collective-bargaining relationship with either of the employers at the time Schoux and
Choate engaged in the conduct for which they were fined.").
4s See id. at 1001-02.
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working for a company implicates section 8(b)(1)(B), this was an
entirely plausible extrapolation from the language and reasoning of

ABC.
The Ninth Circuit, relying on prior circuit authority 46 in which
the NLRB had declined to acquiesce, 47 concluded that liability under
section 8(b)(1)(B) required a closer connection between union action
and employer choice of representative than was found by the agency:
"when a union does not represent or intend to represent the
complaining company's employees there can be no Section 8(b)(1)(B)
violation when a union disciplines members even if they are

designated bargaining representatives." 48
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision by a 63 vote, with Justice White, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice
O'Connor dissenting. The five-justice majority began by questioning
whether the disciplined union members even counted as employer
representatives for section 8(b)(1)(B) purposes in this context. After
all, the union members were disciplined for actions in their capacities
as union members, not for actions in their capacities as bargaining or
grievance-adjustment representatives for the employer. The NLRB
nonetheless treated all supervisory personnel as section 8(b)(1)(B)
representatives, regardless of the functions that they actually
performed at the time of the union discipline, on the theory that the
universe of supervisory personnel constituted a "reservoir" of
potential bargaining or grievance-adjusting representatives, 49 so that
anything that reduced the incentives of employees to be supervisors
effectively interfered with the employer's free future choices of
section 8(b)(1)(B) representatives. The Supreme Court majority

See NLRB v. Int'l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, 714 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1980).
See 271 N.L.R.B. at 1001.
48 See NLRB v. Int'l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, Local 340, 780 F.2d 1489, 1492 (9th
Cir. 1986).
49 See 481 U.S. at 586-87 (discussing the evolution of and stated rationales for this
"reservoir" doctrine).
46

47
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specifically rejected this doctrine-even though it was mentioned
only in passing by the NLRB in its decision in the case and was not
50
raised by the petition for certiorari.
The crux of the majority's opinion was its conclusion that "the
absence of a collective-bargaining relationship between the union
[of coercion of
and the employer . .. makes the possibility ...
employers] too attenuated to form the basis of an unfair labor practice

charge."51
In other words, the assumption underpinning Florida Power
and ABC-that an adverse effect can occur simply by virtue
of the fact that an employer representative is disciplined for
behavior that occurs during performance of § 8(b)(1)(B)
tasks-is not applicable when the employer has no
52
continuing relationship with the union.

The Court noted that the union discipline in this case "does not coerce
Royal and Nutter in their selection of § 8(b)(1)(B) representatives.
Section 8(b)(1)(B) . . . was not intended to prevent enforcement of
uniform union rules that may occasionally have the incidental effect
53
of making a supervisory position less desirable." Such reasoning
from the "incidental effect" of union discipline on employer options
was, of course, precisely the reasoning of numerous prior NLRB
decisions, and it was precisely the reasoning underlying ABC, which
read section 8(b)(1)(B) to foreclose union discipline of supervisors
who performed any grievance-adjustment functions at all, including
functions involving personal grievances and grievances involving

so

See id. at 599 n.1 (White, J., dissenting). The NLRB's "reservoir" doctrine was

certainly dubious as a matter of statutory construction, but Justice White seems right
that it was not necessary or appropriate for the Court to reach the issue in this case.

Justice Scalia agreed that it was not necessary to reach the issue. See id. at 596 (Scalia,

J., concurring in

the judgment).

Id. at 589.
52 Id. at 590.
53Id. at 591.
5'
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employees who do not belong to the disciplining union. The Court
explained in a footnote:

ABC does suggest in dictum that any discipline that affects a
supervisor-member's "willingness to serve" as a
supervisor is unlawful ....

§ 8(b)(1)(B)

This statement was unnecessary to the disposition of ABC.
There the Court held that the union fines had adversely
affected the manner in which the employer representatives
fulfilled § 8(b)(1)(B)functions and therefore interfered with the
employer's control over its representatives.54
The dissenting opinion, emphasizing the Court's long history of
deference to the NLRB in the interpretation of the labor laws, 55
argued that the majority downplayed the significance of ABC:
Moreover, we traveled this road previously in ABC.... [W]e

agreed with the Board that ABC was "restrained and coerced
within the meaning of § 8(b)(1)(B) by being totally deprived
of the opportunity to choose these particular supervisors as
[its]
collective-bargaining
or
grievance-adjustment
representatives during the strike." The manner in which these
supervisor-members performed their duties was obviously
not affected since they performed no duties during the strike;
as here, it was their willingness to serve as employer

M4 Id. at 591 n.15 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
55 The dissenting opinion did not, in 1987, make any mention of the 1984 decision
in Chevron. That will only be surprising to people who believe that the Chevron
doctrine in the Supreme Court originated in the 1984 Chevron decision. That is
manifestly not what happened. The Chevron doctrine was a lower-court creation that

did not penetrate the Supreme Court until many years after the Chevron decision. It
was still in its earliest stages of penetration in 1987. See Gary Lawson & Stephen Kam,
Making Law Out of Nothing at All: The Origins of the Chevron Doctrine, 65 ADMIN. L. REV.
1 (2013).
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representatives that was at issue. We cited approvingly the
Board's disposition of an unfair labor practice claim
analogous to the claim asserted in ABC and virtually
identical to the one asserted here. In A.S. Horner, Inc., supra,
the Board held that union discipline imposed on a member
who worked as a supervisor for an employer which had no
contract with the union violated § 8(b)(1)(B) because it would
have required the supervisor to leave his job and thus would
have deprived the employer of the services of its selected
representative. 437 U.S at 36, n.36.
... The majority seeks to distinguish ABC on the ground that
respondent here has no collective-bargaining relationship at
all with Royal and Nutter, but this fact is without
significance. The harm is the same in both cases - the union
discipline would deprive the employer of the services of its
56
selected representative.

Thus, the crux of the case, as seen by both the majority and
dissent, was how best to understand the decision in ABC and whether
the Board's action in this case fell within the policies underlying ABC.
Justice Scalia concurred in the result only, as he had a very
different view from either the majority or the dissent about the
relevance of the Court's prior decision in ABC. His concurring
opinion is brief enough to reproduce here in principal part.
... I would affirm the Court of Appeals solely on the ground
that the Union had no collective-bargaining agreement
covering either Royal or Nutter.
Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act . .. by
its plain terms governs only the relationship between unions
and employers, not the relationship between unions and
their members. Further, it pertains to only one aspect of the

56481 U.S. at 600-02 (White, J., dissenting) (some citations omitted).
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union-employer relationship: the employer's selection of a

bargaining

or

grievance

adjustment

representative.

Nonetheless, in American Broadcasting Cos. v. Writers Guild,

Inc., 437 U.S. 411 (1978) (ABC), we affirmed the Board's
application of this statute to union discipline of members
who cross picket lines in order to perform grievance
adjustment work for employers with whom the union has a
collective-bargaining contract. The Board now asks us to
approve an extension of the statute to a still more remote
form of such "restraint" by a union upon employer
"selection," namely, such restraint directed against an
employer with whom the union has no collective-bargaining

agreement.
If the question before us were whether, given the deference
we owe to agency determinations, the Board's construction
of this Court's opinion in ABC is a reasonable one, I would
agree with the Government that it is. We defer to agencies,
however (and thus apply a mere "reasonableness" standard
of review) in their construction of their statutes, not of our
opinions. The question before us is not whether ABC can
reasonably be read to support the Board's decision, but
whether § 8(b)(1)(B) can reasonably be read to support it. It
seems to me that ABC and the Board's prior decision in San
Francisco-Oakland Mailers' Union No. 18 (Northwest

Publications,Inc.), 172 N.L.R.B. 2173 (1968), which held that
unions violate § 8(b)(1)(B) by disciplining memberrepresentatives for the manner in which they interpret
collective-bargaining contracts, represent at best the "outer
limits," FloridaPower & Light Co. v. ElectricalWorkers, 417 U.S.
790, 805 (1974), of any permissible construction of §
8(b)(1)(B). I would certainly go no further, and would
accordingly limit the Board's indirect restraint theory to

circumstances in which there is an actual contract between
the union and affected employer, without regard to whether
the union has an intent to establish such a contract ....
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The Board's approach is the product of a familiar
phenomenon. Once having succeeded, by benefit of
excessive judicial deference, in expanding the scope of a
statute beyond a reasonable interpretation of its language,
the emboldened agency presses the rationale of that

expansion to the limits of its logic. And the Court, having
already sanctioned a point of departure that is genuinely not
to be found within the language of the statute, finds itself cut
off from that authoritative source of the law, and ends up
construing not the statute but its own construction. Applied
to an erroneous point of departure, the logical reasoning that
is ordinarily the mechanism of judicial adherence to the rule
of law perversely carries the Court further and further from
the meaning of the statute. Some distance down that path,
however, there comes a point at which a later incremental
step, again rational in itself, leads to a result so far removed
from the statute that obedience to text must overcome

fidelity to logic ....
That is the case here. Logic is on the side of the Board, but the
statute is with the respondent. I concur in the judgment of
the Court.57
There is a great deal packed into this short opinion, apart from
its textualist interpretation 58 of section 8(b)(1)(B). In particular, it says
much about a topic that appears only episodically in The Essential
Scalia: Justice Scalia's views on judicial precedent.

Many of the cases and speeches excerpted in The Essential Scalia
59
at least implicitly discuss judicial precedent to some degree. That is

57

Id.

58

For insights into Justice Scalia's theories of statutory interpretation, see Scalia,

at 596-98 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).

supra note 4, at 25-30, 247-62.
59 There are many potential sources of precedent other than judicial decisions,

including legislative precedents, executive precedents, and historical precedents, just
to name a few. See, e.g., id. at 13-15 (relying on historical precedents). My discussion
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not surprising; it is rare, in either constitutional or statutory cases, to
encounter an issue on which the Supreme Court has never previously
said anything arguably relevant. It might, therefore, seem odd that
the extensive list of topics covered by The Essential Scalia's Table of
Contents does not include precedent-and, indeed, that there is not
even an entry for "precedent" in the book's index.
On reflection, however, that omission is almost inevitable. Justice
Scalia did not systematically set forth an account of precedent. 60 He
is far from alone in that regard; relatively few jurists or scholars,

across any part of any spectrum, have sought to systematize their
views on precedent. Instead, one normally sees a long list of factors
that sometimes will and sometimes will not tug in this or that
direction, 61 resulting in the bane of Justice Scalia's existence: "the 'ol
'totality of the circumstances' test." 62 No wonder he didn't want to
talk about it that much.

The excerpts included in The Essential Scalia nonetheless reveal a
few things of consequence about Justice Scalia's views on
precedent. 63 On numerous occasions, Justice Scalia applied judicial
precedent in a conventional manner, indistinguishable from the
treatment afforded precedent by almost all justices (essentially

everyone except Justice Thomas).64 On other occasions, he creatively
interpreted - or re-interpreted - prior decisions, in a fashion that is

here is limited only to Justice Scalia's views on the use of prior judicial decisions as
precedents.

&

6 See John O. McGinnis, Scalia Failed to Create a Rule of Law for Precedent, LAW
LIBERTY (Oct. 12, 2016) [https://perma.cc/C6JK-YBN7].
61For a brief summary of the state of stare decisis in the Supreme Court, see Amy
Coney Barrett, Precedent and JurisprudentialDisagreement, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1711, 1712-21
(2013).
62 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63 For more focused accounts of Justice Scalia's expressed thoughts on precedent,
see P. Thomas Distanislao, III, The Highest Court: A Dialogue Between Justice Louis
Brandeis and Justice Antonin Scalia on Stare Decisis, 51 U. RIcH. L. REV. 1149, 1172-73
(2017); David A. Strauss, Tradition, Precedent, and Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOzo L. REV.

1699, 1705-08 (1991).
64 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 4, at 63, 66-67, 105-06, 220-22.
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also familiar to anyone who reads a nontrivial number of Supreme
Court opinions. 65 On perhaps more occasions than some other
justices, he was prepared to overrule precedents when they failed to
66
provide what he regarded as judicially manageable rules and/or
67
represented a blatant usurpation of power. This set him apart only
marginally from other justices.
The vast majority of Justice Scalia's express or close-to-thesurface discussions of judicial precedent occurred in constitutional
cases. But to a formalist, the differences between constitutional and
68
statutory cases are far smaller than the similarities; both classes of
cases involve the ascertainment of the communicative meaning of
putatively authoritative texts. And in Justice Scalia's first term on the
Court, a unified theory of precedent in those textual cases began to

emerge.
Perhaps Justice Scalia's most notable expressions on judicial
precedent in constitutional cases concerned the so-called dormant
commerce clause, under which the Court invalidates state
regulations that, in the Court's view, discriminate against or unduly
burden interstate commerce, even in the absence of a conflict between
69
the state regulation and a valid federal statute. As a matter of

6s See, e.g., id. at 118, 188-89
66 See, e.g., id. at 71-75, 87.
67
See, e.g., id. at 154-58, 210-11.

68 Non-formalists,

to be sure, might draw sharp distinctions between statutory and

constitutional stare decisis, grounded in the functionally-based relative ease of
amending statutory texts, see Allegheny Defense Project v. FERC, 964 F.3d 1, 23 (D.C.
Cir. 2020) (en banc) (Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part)
(collecting cases), even to the point of making statutory stare decisis conclusive or
near-conclusive. See, e.g., Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It": The Case for an

Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177 (1989). And formalists
would likely draw sharp distinctions between constitutional and statutory cases on the
one hand and common law cases on the other.
69 See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S.Ct. 2080, 2090-91 (2018) ("Modern
precedents rest upon two primary principles that mark the boundaries of a State's

authority to regulate interstate commerce. First, state regulations may not discriminate
against interstate commerce; and second, States may not impose undue burdens on
interstate commerce.").
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original meaning, the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause 70
arguably generates something like the antidiscrimination prong of
this doctrine. The portion of the doctrine that polices state regulations
for undue burdens on interstate commerce, however, could be correct
only if Congress's power to regulate commerce among the several

States 71 were an exclusively federal power 72 -in which case, it would
not matter whether the state regulation unduly, or even duly,
burdened interstate commerce, as there would simply be no state
power to regulate interstate commerce period. There is a good
argument that the Constitution, as a matter of original meaning, does
in fact divest the States of any power to regulate interstate
commerce. 73 Of course, given modern (mis)constructions of the
Interstate Commerce Clause, "an exclusive commerce power would
negate almost all state authority," 74 so that that option is doctrinally
off the table in the modern world, however correct it may be as an
original matter. Taking as given that there is some overlap between
state and federal powers to regulate interstate commerce, the
doctrinal result has been a patchwork mess of balancing tests, ad hoc
decisions, and judicial policy judgments which read as though it
were specifically designed to give Justice Scalia indigestion. It is no

70

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all

Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.").
71 Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
72 Instances of such exclusive federal power are not uncommon. See Steven G.
Calabresi & Gary Lawson, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION: CREATION, RECONSTRUCTION, THE
PROGRESSIVES, AND THE MODERN ERA 595-96 (2020).

73 Id. at 692-94.
74 Id. at 694. See also Tyler Pipe Indus.,

Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S.
232, 261 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Now that we
know interstate commerce embraces such activities as growing wheat for home
consumption, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, (1942), and local loan sharking, Perez
v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), it is more difficult to imagine what state activity
would survive an exclusive Commerce Clause than to imagine what would be
precluded.").
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75
surprise that in a 2015 dissenting opinion, excerpted in The Essential
Scalia,76 Justice Scalia called the dormant commerce clause doctrine
"a judicial fraud" in which "we must make the rules up as we go

along." 77
In that opinion, Justice Scalia declared, as he had done on several
occasions beforehand, 78 that "[f]or reasons of stare decisis, I will vote
to set aside a tax under the negative Commerce Clause if (but only if)
it discriminates on its face against interstate commerce or cannot be
distinguished from a tax this Court has already held
unconstitutional." 79 The first part of that dictate represents the view
that the Constitution does in fact prohibit States from discriminating
against interstate commerce, not by virtue of the Commerce Clause,
but by virtue of the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, so
that the precedent ends up, however indirectly, correctly construing
the Constitution. 80 The second part of the dictate represents an
account of precedent with deep implications.
Those implications were made clear in the first case in which
Justice Scalia set out his views on the dormant commerce clause,
decided during his first term on the Court. In Tyler Pipe Industries,Inc.

v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue,81 Justice Scalia dissented from
the Court's insistence that state taxes had to conform to a principle of
"internal consistency," in which the effect of a state tax is judged by
reference to the tax's hypothetical effects if it were to be adopted by

75 Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 575 U.S. 542, 571 (2015)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).

76 See Scalia, supra note 4, at 85-87.

77 Id. at 86.
78 See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass'ns., Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S. 429, 439
(2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
79
Wynne, 575 U.S. at 578.
80 See Tyler Pipe Indus., 483 U.S. at 265 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
81483 U.S. 232 (1987).
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every State. 82 In foreshadowing the view of precedent that he
expressed in 2015, Justice Scalia wrote:

In sum, to the extent that we have gone beyond guarding
against rank discrimination against citizens of other States
... , the Court for over a century has engaged in an enterprise
that it has been unable to justify by textual support or even
coherent nontextual theory, that it was almost certainly not
intended to undertake, and that it has not undertaken very
well. It is astonishing that we should be expanding our
beachhead in this impoverished territory, rather than being

satisfied with what we have already acquired by a sort of
intellectual adverse possession.83
So, exactly how does this passage lead to the conclusion, implicit in
Justice Scalia's Int'l Brotherhood concurrence, that incorrect
precedents should govern only when directly controlling on the
specific facts of the next case?
The answer lies in a simple but powerful idea: precedent is a
device for guiding adjudication; it is not a means for ascertaining the
communicative meaning of a textual instrument.84 Texts mean what
they mean regardless of what any particular interpreter says about
them. One can choose to give some measure of legal effect to prior
interpretations that one considers wrong, but that does not make

those wrong interpretations somehow right as interpretations.A prior
decision can thus be interpretativelywrong but adjudicatively correct
or binding. As Christopher Green has eloquently put it, drawing on
Justice Scalia's analogy to adverse possession:

82

See id. at 254 (Scalia, J., concurring

83 Id. at 265 (Scalia,

J., concurring

in part and dissenting in part).
in part and dissenting in part).

84 The exception would be if the instrument specifically incorporates some idea of
precedent as a tool for its own interpretation.
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Deciding that it is more important that some issues are more
importantly [sic] settled than settled correctly does not alter
the criterion for what answers are actually correct. The
Constitution still means what it means, and interpreters
subject to an adverse-possession rule need neither surrender
their convictions about its meaning through the equivalent
of an intellectual lobotomy, nor believe that interpreters are
free to shift and morph the meaning of the Constitution

without any constraint. Precisely because it is part of
constitutional
not
and
construction,
constitutional
interpretation, an adverse-possession model for adherence to
incorrectly-decided precedent would merely limit the power
of present interpreters to give effect to their interpretations;
85
it would not affect their interpretations as such.
Hence, for Justice Scalia, "precedents do not 'fix' or 'liquidate' (to use
the in-vogue Madisonian term) the Constitution's communicative
meaning. They might, however, generate vested expectations, and if

one treats those expectations as vested rights, then there is an
86
adjudicative basis for leaving those vested rights untouched."
Justice Scalia's analogy to adverse possession helps explain this
account of the nature and limits of precedent. If someone adversely
possesses property, that act does not change the communicative
meaning of the grant that created the now-adversely-possessed
interest. The grant, as a matter of communicative meaning, still

conveyed the property to the previous possessor. As far as the grant
is concerned, nothing has changed simply because a wrongdoer has
been a wrongdoer for a long enough period of time. As a matter of
adjudication, however, the law of adverse possession chooses to

85 Christopher R. Green, Constitutional Theory and the Activismometer: How to Think
About Indeterminacy, Restraint, Vagueness, Executive Review, and Precedent, 54 SANTA

CLARA L. REV. 403 (2014).
86 Gary Lawson, A PrivateLaw Frameworkfor Subdelegation, in THE ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT: PERSPECTIVES ON THE NONDELEGATION DOCrRINE
-, - (Peter J. Wallison & John Yoo eds., 2021)
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ignore the ordinary legal consequences of the grant. Importantly,
adverse possession of one interest in a grant has no effect, either
communicative or legal, on the other interests in the grant. Adverse
possession of a present interest, for example, has no effect on future
interests created by the same instrument. Nor would an objectively
faulty judgment allowing adverse possession of the present interest
entail or justify later objectively faulty judgments regarding the
meaning or status of future interests. The meaning of the grant is one
thing; its legal effect is another. Adverse possession affects the grant's
legal effect, but it does not affect the grant's communicative meaning.
Justice Scalia's comments in Tyler Pipe extend this model to
judicial precedent in constitutional cases. When courts choose
precedent over constitutional meaning, they are allowing a past
wrong to prevail over the formally valid "title" represented by the

Constitution's objective communicative meaning. There are many
reasons why someone in real-world adjudication might choose past
practices over textual meaning, just as there are many reasons why
someone in real-world adjudication might choose long possession
over granted title. Indeed, many of the arguments often advanced in
favor of precedent-stability, reliance, cost-savings, and so forthare also arguments that are often made in defense of adverse
possession. 87 But in the end, precedent is not a tool for the
interpretation of texts, any more than is the law of adverse
possession. Rather, it is a reason for choosing to ignore the correct

87 For a compendium of arguments in favor of adverse possession, see Jeffrey Evans
Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO. L.J. 2419 (2001). For similar
compendia of arguments in favor of precedent, see THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT
(Bryan A. Garner ed., 2016); Randy J. Kozel, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF
PRECEDENT (2017). To be clear: I am not endorsing the arguments for either precedent
or adverse possession. Indeed, I am a somewhat notorious critic of the former (and no
huge fan of the latter). See Gary Lawson, The ConstitutionalCase Against Precedent, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23 (1994); Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case
Against Precedent Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1 (2007). I am simply pointing out their
similarities.
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interpretation of texts in certain circumstances. Justice Scalia
recognized this point, and it grounds the rest of his approach to
precedent in textual cases.
Once one understands that precedent does not ascertain, much

less change, the objective meaning of texts, the role of precedent gets
determined by the role that one thinks that texts should play in
adjudication. One very powerful normative model of decisionmaking, to which Justice Scalia mostly subscribed, treats putatively
authoritative texts, such as the Constitution and duly enacted
statutes, as actually authoritative. On this model, the text always
serves as a reference point for evaluating decisions made in the name
of that text. 88 The text, in other words, is hierarchically superior to
statements made about the text by any particular interpreters. An
adherent to this view might consider treating some textually
incorrect prior decisions as settled law by virtue of the expectations
that have grown up around them, but such a person would not
regard those textually incorrect decisions as reference points for
ascertaining the meaning of the texts. Wrong decisions might be left
in place, but they would not be used as jumping-off points for further
reasoning about texts that could justify the generation of future
errors. Just as the reach of adverse possession stops with the physical
and temporal borders of the wrongfully possessed land, one can say
that the reach of incorrect textual interpretations stops at the
boundaries of the prior decision. Operationally, this amounts to
saying to incorrect precedents: "Hitherto shalt thou come, but no
further."

89

as See Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: Text, Precedent,
and Burke, 57 ALA. L. REV. 635 (2006). Again, to be clear: I am not endorsing this model
of adjudication; I am merely describing it.
89 At the risk of tedium: My point here is to describe this position, not to defend it.

Persons who value certain forms of social order, or who simply prefer past decisions
to the texts that they misinterpret, will likely find fault with this limited account of

precedent. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 MINN.
L. REV. 1173, 1182-83 (2006). An evaluation of this model of adjudication is a topic for
another day and another scholar.
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If that model holds for constitutional interpretation, does it hold
for statutory interpretation as well? There is no obvious formalist
reason why it would not. Accordingly, in the same term in which he
analogized constitutional precedent to adverse possession, Justice
Scalia wrote his concurring opinion in Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, Local 340. The upshot of that opinion was to reason to the
outcome of the case from the statute rather than from prior decisions
issued in the name of the statute. If the particular facts of those prior
decisions did not directly and specifically dictate the outcome in the
present case, that outcome must be evaluated by reference to the
statute rather than the prior decisions. If some of those prior decisions
were wrong (and Justice Scalia surely regarded at least some of the
prior interpretations of section 8(b)(1)(B) as wrong), one might
choose to leave them in place, just as one might leave in place an
adverse possessor. But, one would not treat them as reference points
for reasoning about new applications of the statute. The prior
decisions operate as a side constraint on the results that one reaches
by direct interpretation of the statute, but they do not mediate the

interpretative process itself.
This account of precedent, of course, leaves unanswered the key
question how one knows when prior decisions "cannot be
distinguished" 90 from the case at hand. That is a question that

plagues all theories of precedent, in any context, and Justice Scalia's
analogy to adverse possession does not simplify the inquiry. But, it
does constrain the inquiry considerably. One performs only a limited
act of interpretation with regard to judicial opinions: one ascertains
the scope of their precise holding. One does not then go on to
ascertain or interpret their interpretations of authoritative texts.

Those texts speak for themselves.
That is quite a lot to draw out of a short opinion that no other
Supreme Court opinion has ever cited. But, if one understands what

90 Wynne, 575 U.S. at 57
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Justice Scalia was saying in Int'l Brotherhood of ElectricalWorkers, Local
340, one will understand much about Justice Scalia's jurisprudence
and about jurisprudence more broadly.

II.

"EYES DOWN, ROUND AND ROUND, LET'S ALL SIT AND

WATCH THE MONEY GO ROUND, EVERYONE TAKES A LITTLE
BIT HERE AND A LITTLE BIT THERE..., AND IT COMES OUT
HERE, WHEN THEY'VE ALL TAKEN THEIR SHARE."

9

1

92
Zuni Public School Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Education is an album
cut in the same way that Elton John's "Funeral for a Friend/Love Lies
Bleeding" are93 album cuts from Goodbye Yellow Brick Road: they were
never released as singles, but everyone knows of them, and they have

gotten more airplay over the years than have many "hit" singles from
other artists. Zuni is similarly less obscure than Int'l Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, Local 340-partly because the Zuni case involves
the controversial Chevron doctrine and partly because it contains one
of Justice Scalia's most memorable phrases, in which he described the
majority's interpretation of a statute as "sheer applesauce." 94
Nonetheless, I am aware of only one law review article that pays
95
serious attention to Zuni as a case, and Justice Scalia's dissenting
opinion was not excerpted in The Essential Scalia. That omission was
entirely sensible, not only because the case is factually complex but
also because Justice Scalia's views come out most clearly only when

91 THE KINKS, The Moneygoround, LOLA VERSUS POWERMAN AND THE
MONEYGOROUND, PART ONE (Reprise 1970).
92550 U.S. 81 (2007).
93 They are two distinct songs, but they are almost always played together - much

like "Heartbreaker" and "Living Loving Maid (She's Just a Woman)" from Led Zeppelin
II, "Sgt. Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band" and "With a Little Help from My Friends"
from Sgt. Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band, and "Brain Damage" and "Eclipse" from
Dark Side of the Moon. There are other examples of frequently paired songs; making a
fuller list is left as an exercise for the reader/listener.
94 Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89, 550 U.S. at 113 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The sheer
applesauce of this statutory interpretation should be obvious.").
95
See Osamudia R. James, Breaking Free of Chevron's Constraints:Zuni Public School

District No. 89 v. U.S. Department of Education, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 147 (2007).
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they are contrasted with the views of other justices that are expressed
in other opinions issued in the case. When that full context is brought
to bear, however, Zuni may be the single best indicator of Justice
Scalia's thoughts on statutory interpretation, and it therefore

deserves a spot in this essay.
The story behind the case is mercifully a bit shorter, though

perhaps no less convoluted, than the story behind Int'l Brotherhoodof
Electrical Workers, Local 340. Many public school districts throughout
the United States are funded largely through local property taxes. It
is well understood that this funding mechanism can create vast

resource disparities among school districts with widely varying tax
bases. While state-law challenges to such funding disparities are
commonplace, the United States Supreme Court has thus far closed
the door to federal constitutional challenges to reliance on local taxes
for school funding, 96 so that such taxes remain a principal source of
revenue for many local public school agencies.
On some occasions, the federal government itself is one potential
source of inter-district disparities in resources. In many States that
that were not part of the land transferred to the United States in 1783
by the Treaty of Paris,97 the United States is a major landowner, with
Native American tribes also owning significant percentages of land.
For example, the federal government owns more than one-third of
the land in New Mexico, 98 while Native American tribes own an
additional ten percent. 99 Because States cannot tax federal or Native

American land without the consent of those sovereigns, roughly half
the land in New Mexico is off limits to state or local taxation. Much
of that land is in rural areas, which means that rural counties and
school districts are likely to face a property tax base in which a large

96
97

See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Definitive Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80.

98 See BALLOTPEDIA, Federal Land Policy in New Mexico [https://perma.cc/GBH2-

392V].
99

See ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, New Mexico [https://perma.cc/P3SV-5C4R].
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portion of the land-quite possibly far more than half in those
areas -is not subject to taxation. A double-whammy comes from the
obligation of the local public school districts to provide free
education to children who live on that non-taxable land, whether it
be federal land (such as military bases) or tribal land. Public school
districts with a large federal or tribal presence thus face heightened
educational resource demands coupled with potentially drastic
restraints on their ability to raise funds.
Although the federal government was aware of (and took modest
100
steps toward addressing) this problem from a very early date,
Congress first systematically responded to these concerns in 1950 by

passing a statute "[t]o

provide financial assistance for local

101
The
educational agencies in areas affected by Federal activities."
current version of the statute's statement of purpose provides:

In order to fulfill the Federal responsibility to assist with the
provision of educational services to federally connected
children in a manner that promotes control by local
educational agencies with little or no Federal or State
involvement, because certain activities of the Federal
Government, such as activities to fulfill the responsibilities of
the Federal Government with respect to Indian tribes and
activities under section 4001 of Title 50 [dealing with military
personnel], place a financial burden on the local educational

agencies serving areas where such activities are carried out,
and to help such children meet the same challenging State
academic standards, it is the purpose of this subchapter to
provide financial assistance to local educational agencies
that-

100 See NAT'L Ass'N OF FEDERALLY IMPACTED SCHOOLS, THE BASICS OF IMPACT AID 7
(2016).
101 Act of Sept. 30, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-874, ch. 1124, 64 Stat. 1100 (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 7701-14).
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(1) experience a substantial and continuing financial burden

due to the acquisition of real property by the United States;
(2) educate children who reside on Federal property and
whose parents are employed on Federal property;
(3) educate children of parents who are in the military
services and children who live in low-rent housing;
(4) educate heavy concentrations of children whose parents
are civilian employees of the Federal Government and do not

reside on Federal property; or
(5) need special assistance with capital expenditures for
construction activities because of the enrollments of
substantial numbers of children who reside on Federal lands

and because of the difficulty of raising local revenue through
bond referendums for capital projects due to the inability to
tax Federal property. 102
The statute contains criteria for determining the amounts of
payments to local educational agencies. 103 For fiscal year 2020,
appropriations for such payments exceeded one billion dollars. 104
In a world of unintended consequences, however, action often
begets reaction. Even in States that rely on local property taxes for the
lion's share of public school funding, there is typically some measure
of centralized state funding to try to address the problem of resourcepoor districts. Suppose that you are a State in 1950 that has been
providing assistance to districts within your State that face the federal
or tribal double-whammy of student demand and non-taxable

property. The federal government now agrees to offset some portion
of the costs imposed by the federal presence. Do you continue to

U.S.C. § 7701 (2018).
See id. § 7703.
See id. § 7714(b).

10220
10
10
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provide the same level of centralized state aid? Surely not. Why

impose on your own taxpayers when you can have taxpayerspresent or future - in other States foot the bill for you? Thus, a
predictable result of the federal impact aid law was a reduction in
state aid to poor school districts in States that receive such federal

funding.
A federal court in 1968-in a decision that Justice Scalia likely
would have regarded as "sheer applesauce" -read into the federal
impact aid statute a prohibition on state reductions in aid to local
105
The
districts predicated on the receipt of federal impact aid money.
to
amendment
1966
a
was
1968
in
provision
a
such
to
closest thing

the impact aid statute providing:
The amount which a local educational agency in any State is
otherwise entitled to receive ... for any fiscal year shall be
reduced in the same proportion (if any) that the State has
reduced for that year its aggregate expenditures (from nonFederal sources) per pupil for current expenditure purposes
below the level of such
for free public education ...
106
expenditures per pupil in the second preceding fiscal year.
This provision tied federal aid to overall state educational spending
but did not specifically address a State's inter-district allocation of
funds. Nonetheless, under the non-textual modes of statutory
interpretation that broadly prevailed in that era, the federal impact
aid statute was assumed by the court to forbid States from offsetting
local agencies' receipt of federal money with reductions in state aid
to impacted local educational agencies.
In 1974, building on the assumption that the statute implicitly
contained the foregoing prohibition on reductions in state aid to
impacted school districts, Congress carved out an exception to that
(phantom) prohibition for States that were attempting to equalize

See Shepheard v. Godwin, 280 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Va. 1968).
Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-750,
§ 203, 80 Stat. 1212.
10s

106
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expenditures among districts. 107 The prohibition and the exception
were formally codified in 1994,108 so that the statute now explicitly
provides that States generally may not take into account federal
impact aid money when determining "(A) the eligibility of a local
educational agency for State aid for free public education; or (B) the
amount of such aid," 109 but that "[a] State may reduce State aid to a
local educational agency ...
if the Secretary [of Education]
determines, and certifies ... , that the State has in effect a program of
State aid that equalizes expenditures for free public education among
local educational agencies in the State."11 0
One big question under this now-explicit (or, if one prefers, nowreal) statute is how to determine whether a State has "a program of

State aid that equalizes expenditures" for education, such that State
offsets in aid will not lead to cut-offs in federal funding. The statute
provides criteria for making that determination:

"

[A] program of State aid equalizes expenditures among local
educational agencies if, in the second fiscal year preceding
the fiscal year for which the determination is made, the
amount of per-pupil expenditures made by, or per-pupil
revenues available to, the local educational agency in the
State with the highest such per-pupil expenditures or
revenues did not exceed the amount of such per-pupil
expenditures made by, or per-pupil revenues available to,
the local educational agency in the State with the lowest such
expenditures or revenues by more than 25 percent.1

See Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 304, 88 Stat. 531.
§ 8009, 108
Stat. 3518.
10920 U.S.C. § 7709(a)(1) (2018).
hold. § 7709(b).
111 Id. § 7709(b)(2)(A).
107

108 See Improving America's Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 102-382,
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There is also a proviso on the application of those criteria: "In making
a determination under this subsection, the Secretary shall- (i)
disregard local educational agencies with per-pupil expenditures or
revenues above the 95th percentile or below the 5th percentile of such
112
expenditures or revenues in the State."
The meaning of this set of statutory provisions is stunningly
obvious. The Secretary of Education is supposed to determine, for
any given State, whether the difference between the highest and
lowest level of district-based per-pupil expenditures is twenty-five
percent or lower. In making that calculation, one disregards, in
Olympic judging fashion, those districts with the highest five percent
and lowest five percent level of per-pupil expenditures. If, for
example, a State has eighty-nine school districts, one would ignore
the four (five percent of eighty-nine) districts with the highest and
lowest per-pupil expenditures, look at the eighty-one districts that
remain, and see if the highest per-pupil expenditures in any district
exceed the lowest level in any district by more than twenty-five
percent. If the answer to that question is "no," then the State has an
equalization program within the meaning of the statute, and such a
State could then take account of federal monies when determining its
own level of local aid. This is not a difficult problem of interpretation.
The only wiggle room comes from the possibility of calculating the
percentile numbers in a slightly different fashion: Perhaps, one could
say that because ten percent of the eighty-nine districts is 8.9, one
should round that up to nine and round up 4.5 (one-half of nine) at
the top and bottom of the distribution to five, and thus exclude ten
rather than eight districts from the final list for comparison of perpupil expenditures by district. That would be a bit of stretch, but it is
not an impossible one given the statutory text. But, that is as far as
the statute could conceivably let anyone go in excluding districts
from the equalization calculation.

112 Id.

§ 7709(b)(2)(B)(i).
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The federal government, to the surprise of nobody familiar with
administrative law or government in general, came up with a wholly
different way to make the calculations required by the statute. In
1976, the Commissioner of Education within the `Department of
Health, Education and Welfare (the Department of Education had not
yet been created and HEW had not yet been renamed the Department
of Health and Human Services) adopted rules that excluded districts
from the equalization program calculations based on the number of

pupils rather than the number of school districts by "identifying those
local agencies in each ranking which fall at the 95th and 5th percentiles of the total number of pupils in attendance in the schools of
these agencies." 1 3 In response to commenters who pointed out that
the statute rather plainly required the calculation to be based on
districts rather than pupils, the Commissioner responded:
[I]t is the Commissioner's view that basing an exclusion on
numbers of districts would act to apply the disparity
standard in an unfair and inconsistent manner among States.
The purpose of the exclusion is to eliminate those anomalous
characteristics of a distribution of expenditures. In States
with a small number of large districts, an exclusion based on
percentage of school districts might exclude from the

measure of the disparity a substantial percentage of the pupil
population in those States. Conversely, in States with large
numbers of small districts, such an approach might exclude

only an insignificant fraction of the pupil population and
would not exclude anomalous characteristics.11 4
The Commissioner's view might well be sound as a matter of policy.
But the statute plainly makes local educational agencies (meaning

1 See Interim Regulations for Treatment of Payments Under State Equalization

Programs, 41 Fed. Reg. 26,320, 26,329 (1976).
114 Id. at 26,324.
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school districts) rather than pupils the relevant objects of inquiry.
Nonetheless, the 1976 calculation method was carried forward in
subsequent regulations, including regulations following the 1994
formal codification of the equalization program exception and its
11 5
mode of calculation.

For fiscal year 2000, the Secretary of Education applied the pupilbased methodology to New Mexico. Instead of knocking eight or ten
districts off the list of the State's eighty-nine districts before
comparing the highest and lowest per-pupil expenditures by district
in that State, the Secretary knocked off twenty-three -more than a
quarter of the total number of school districts in the State. That is
because the "top" seventeen districts and the "bottom" six districts,
measured by student population, rather than by per-pupil
expenditures, each collectively contained less than five percent of the
State's student population. Using the sixty-six districts remaining
after these twenty-three were disregarded, the Secretary concluded
that New Mexico had an equalization program and could reduce aid
to local districts based on the receipt of federal money. If the
calculation was instead performed with eighty-one or seventy-nine
districts, New Mexico would not have had an equalization program
1 6
as defined by the statute and regulations. u
As was explained by the petitioning school districts:
The Zuni Public School District is a New Mexico public
school district located entirely within the Pueblo of Zuni
Reservation. It has virtually no tax base. Over 65% of the

Gallup-McKinley County Public School District No. 1
consists of Navajo Reservation lands which are also not
11 7
taxable by State school districts.

tt5

The current version of the regulatory calculation method is found at 34 C.F.R. pt.

222, App.
116 See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89, 550 U.S. at 88-89.
17 Br. Pet'rs at 2, Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81 (2007)
(No. 05-1508), 2006 WL 3350569, at *2.
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Those districts thus rely heavily on federal and/or state aid for
funding. The Secretary of Education's ruling that New Mexico had
an equalization program in place opened the door for New Mexico
to reduce its state aid to those districts (which it presumably would
do, on the theory that politicians can buy votes more efficiently in
densely rather than sparsely populated areas 1' 8 ). The school districts'
real beef was with the State of New Mexico, but they presumably had
no effective remedy at state law if their state funding was cut, so they
sued to overturn the Secretary of Education's equalization program
ruling. A Tenth Circuit panel affirmed the Secretary's decision, 119 and
the en banc Tenth Circuit divided 6-6, leaving the affirmance in

place.12 The Supreme Court took the case.
A five-justice majority affirmed the Secretary's decision. The
majority's interpretative methodology teed up Justice Scalia for one
of his most memorable and important opinions.
The school districts, understandably enough, hammered away at
the plain language of the statute, which speaks of local educational
agencies rather than pupils as the basic units of analysis for making
calculations about equalization programs. But, the majority began
elsewhere:
Considerations other than language provide us with
unusually strong indications that Congress intended to leave

the Secretary free to use the calculation method before us and
that the Secretary's chosen method is a reasonable one. For

178 See In re Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 & Gallup-McKinley Pub. Sch., U.S. Dep't of
Educ., Office of Hearings and Appeal Hearing, No. 99-81-1 (2000), reprinted in Joint
Appendix, Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., No. 05-1508, at 8, 64
(argument of counsel for Gallup-McKinley) ("the money which the state has taken

which is basically a substitute for property tax for the lack of private land in McKinley
County they're using for operational purposes.").
119 See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 393 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir.
2004).
120 See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 437 F.3d 1289 (10th Cir.
2006) (en banc).
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one thing, the matter at issue - i.e., the calculation method for
determining whether a state aid program "equalizes
expenditures"-is the kind of highly technical, specialized
interstitial matter that Congress often does not decide itself,
but delegates to specialized agencies to decide.
For another thing, the history of the statute strongly supports
the Secretary ....

Finally, viewed in terms of the purpose of the statute's
disregard instruction, the Secretary's calculation method is
reasonable, while the reasonableness of a method based
upon the number of districts alone (Zuni's proposed method)
121
is more doubtfu.
"Thus," said the Court, "the history and purpose of the disregard
instruction indicate that the Secretary's calculation formula is a
reasonable method that carries out Congress' likely intent in enacting
122
the statutory provision before us."
123
In a discussion
"But what of the provision's literal language?"
too lengthy to summarize here, which contained extensive analyses
of the meaning of terms like "percentile," "per," and "populations,"

but none of which directly addressed the basicfact that the statute's unit of
analysis is local educational agencies rather than pupils, the majority
found the language of the statute ambiguous enough to give the
Secretary Chevron deference and uphold the agency's determination.
The Court, in particular, drew
reassurance from the fact that no group of statisticians, nor
any individual statistician, has told us directly in briefs, or
indirectly through citation, that the language before us

121 Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89, 550 U.S. at 90-91 (citations omitted).
122 Id. at 93.
1

Id.
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cannot be read as we have read it. This circumstance is
significant, for the statutory language is technical, and we are
not statisticians. 124
Two justices-Justices Kennedy and Alito-joined the majority
opinion but would have started the analysis with the language of the
statute rather than with extra-textual concerns.12 5 Justice Stevens also
joined the majority opinion but emphasized in a separate opinion
"that a judicial decision that departs from statutory text may
represent 'policy-driven interpretation' . . . [but] [a]s long as that
driving policy is faithful to the intent of Congress (or, as in this case,
aims only to give effect to such intent) ... the decision is also a correct
performance of the judicial function."1 26 He explained:
This happens to be a case in which the legislative history is
pellucidly clear and the statutory text is difficult to fathom.
Moreover, it is a case in which I cannot imagine anyone
accusing any Member of the Court of voting one way or the
other because of that Justice's own policy preferences.
Given the clarity of the evidence of Congress' "intention on
the precise question at issue," I would affirm the judgment
of the Court of Appeals even if I thought that petitioners'
literal reading of the statutory text was correct. 127
Thus, Justice Stevens was openly prepared to disregard the
statutory language in pursuit of perceived congressional intentions.

The agency was openly prepared to disregard the statutory language
in pursuit of what the agency regarded as good policy. The majority
was a bit less open about exactly what it was doing. If one
extrapolates from Justice Breyer's general approach to statutory

Id. at 99-100.
See id. at 107 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
126 Id. at 105 (Stevens, J., concurring).
127 Id. at 106-07 (footnote omitted).
124
125
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interpretation, one might characterize the majority opinion's
interpretive approach as following two steps: (1) ascertain whether
the agency's position represents a reasonable policy choice and then
(2) determine whether that policy choice is expressly and
128
The latter methodology
unmistakably forbidden by the statute.
does not openly disregard the statutory language, but it treats the
language essentially as a side constraint on other, more primary
modes of interpretation.
Enter Justice Scalia. The table was nicely set for him by the
administrative law judge from the initial challenge within the
Department of Education, who had the following exchange with
counsel for the Department of Education:

[JUDGE LEWIS]: And I've got a real problem if I have to
decide this thing if I have to choose between what's in the
statute and what's in the regulation. If you can show me the
statute's ambiguous then under normal rules of construction
you can then move over to the regulations which then
interpret an ambiguous statute.

The problem is I don't see the ambiguity of the statute.
MR. SMITH: The only way I can do that is by reference to the
statutory purpose. We've tried to provide evidence in the
record to indicate that to give the disparity test utility this is
the only possible interpretation.

JUDGE LEWIS: But the only thing that we have from
Congress is what Congress said in the statue.

128 This is essentially the position advanced by Justice Breyer in portions of his
dissenting opinion in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 180-81
(2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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MR. SMITH: Well

JUDGE LEWIS: And if we go with Justice Scalia he would
say, That's it.129
And, indeed, Justice Scalia (writing for three other justices as
well) said, "That's it." More precisely, he said that "today's decision
is nothing other than the elevation of judge-supposed legislative
intent over clear statutory text." 130 The majority, he wrote, provides
"page after page of unenacted congressional intent and judicially
perceived statutory purpose"131 when the text of the statute was
plain. As for the majority's long detour into dictionary definitions of
"percentile" and concerns about technical language, Justice Scalia
retorted: "This case is not a scary math problem; it is a
straightforward matter of statutory interpretation. And we do not
need the Court's hypothetical cadre of number-crunching amici to
guide our way."1 32 As predicted by the ALJ, this was an easy case for

Justice Scalia:
"

There is no dispute that for purposes relevant here
'percentile' refers to a division of a distribution of some

population into 100 parts.' " Ante, at 95. And there is further
no dispute that the statute concerns the percentile of "perpupil expenditures or revenues," for that is what the word
"such" refers to .... [133] The question is: Whose per-pupil
expenditures or revenues? ... At first blush, second blush, or
twenty-second blush, the answer is abundantly clear: local

129 See In re Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. #89 & Gallup-McKinley Pub. Sch., U.S. Dep't of
Educ., Office of Hearings and Appeal Hearing, No. 99-81-1 (2000), reprinted in Joint
Appendix, Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., No. 05-1508, at 29-30.
130 Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89, 550 U.S. at 108 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

131 Id.
132 Id.

at 111 (citation omitted).
It is a bit surprising that Justice Scalia, the master stylist, did not say "for that is
to what the word 'such' refers."
133

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty

2021]

DEEP TRACKS: ALBUM CUTS THAT HELP DEFINE THE ESSENTIAL SCALIA

educational agencies [LEAs].

. .

215

. The attribute "per-pupil

expenditur[e] or revenu[e]" is assigned to LEAs -- there is no
mention of student population whatsoever. And thus under
the statute, "per-pupil expenditures or revenues" are to be
arrayed using a population consisting of LEAs, so that
percentiles are determined from a list of (in New Mexico) 89
per-pupil expenditures or revenues representing the 89
134
LEAs in the State. It is just that simple.

Justice Scalia's patience, whatever was left of it, ran out when the
majority echoed an argument put forward by New Mexico by

insisting that "nothing in the English language prohibits the
Secretary from considering expenditures for each individual pupil in
a district when instructed to look at a district's 'per-pupil
expenditures.' "135 In other words, as New Mexico put it: "Each and
every student in an LEA and in a state may be treated as having his
136
so that in
or her own 'per-pupil' expenditure or revenue amount,"
or
expenditures
"per-pupil
317,777
New Mexico there would be
revenues" for the Secretary of Education to rank for purposes of
137
Justice
determining the 5th and 95th percentiles of expenditures.
was:
response
Scalia's memorable

The sheer applesauce of this statutory interpretation should
be obvious. It is of course true that every student in New
Mexico causes an expenditure or produces a revenue that his
LEA either enjoys (in the case of revenues) or is responsible
for (in the case of expenditures). But it simply defies any
semblance of normal English usage to say that every pupil
has a "per-pupil expenditure or revenue" . . . . It is simply
irrelevant that "[n]o dictionary definition ... suggests that

Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89, 550 U.S. at 111-12 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 97-98.
136 Br. Resp't at 36, Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81
(2007) (No. 05-1508), 2006 WL 3740364, at *36.
137 See id. at 37.
134
135
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there is any single logical, mathematical, or statistical link
between [per-pupil expenditures or revenues] and . . . the
nature of the relevant population." Ante, at 96. Of course
there is not. It is the text at issue which must identify the
relevant population,
and it does so here quite
unambiguously: "local educational agencies with per-pupil
expenditures or revenues." § 7709(b)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis
added).138
In a portion of the dissent joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Thomas, though not by Justice Souter (who joined the rest of
it139), Justice Scalia took on Justice Stevens' open embrace of choosing
purposes and intentions over statutory text:
[O]nce one departs from "strict interpretation of the text" (by
which Justice Stevens means the actual meaning of the text)
fidelity to the intent of Congress is a chancy thing. The only
thing we know for certain both Houses of Congress (and the
President, if he signed the legislation) agreed upon is the text.
Legislative history can never produce a "pellucidly clear"
picture of what a law was "intended" to mean, for the simple

reason that it is never voted upon-or ordinarily even seen
or heard-by

the "intending"

lawgiving entity, which

consists of both Houses of Congress and the President (if he
did not veto the bill). See U.S. Const., Art. I, §§ 1, 7. Thus,
what judges believe Congress "meant" (apart from the text)
has a disturbing but entirely unsurprising tendency to be
whatever judges think Congress must have meant, i.e., should
have meant. In Churchof the Holy Trinity, every Justice on this

Court disregarded the plain language of a statute that
forbade the hiring of a clergyman from abroad because, after

138 Zuni

Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89, 550 U.S. at 113 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

139 See id. at 123 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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all (they thought), "this is a Christian nation," 143 U.S., at
471, so Congress could not have meant what it said. Is there
any reason to believe that those Justices were lacking that
"intellectua[l] honest[y]" that Justice Stevens "presume[s]"
all our judges possess? Intellectual honesty does not exclude
a blinding intellectual bias. And even if it did, the system of
judicial amendatory veto over texts duly adopted by
Congress bears no resemblance to the system of lawmaking
set forth in our Constitution.
Justice Stevens takes comfort in the fact that this is a case in
which he "cannot imagine anyone accusing any Member of
the Court of voting one way or the other because of that
Justice's own policy preferences." I can readily imagine it,
given that the Court's opinion begins with a lengthy
description of why the system its judgment approves is the
better one. But even assuming that, in this rare case, the
Justices' departure from the enacted law has nothing to do
with their policy view that it is a bad law,... [w]hy should
we suppose that in matters more likely to arouse the judicial
or
laws,
antidiscrimination
rights,
libido-voting
environmental protection, to name only a few -a judge in
the School of Textual Subversion would not find it

convenient (yea, righteous! ) to assume that Congress must
140
have meant, not what it said, but what he knows to be best?

All of Justice Scalia's key principles of statutory interpretation
that are presented so well by Sutton and Whelan -his disdain for
141
searching for subjective legislative intentions outside of the text,
142
and his doubts about
the priority of text over policy concerns,
143
-are on
using legislative history to overturn textual meaning

140 Id. at 116-18 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
141 See Scalia, supra note 4, at 26-29.
142 See 550 U.S. at 251-52, 258-59, 267.
143 See id. at 268-79.
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display in this opinion. When Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner were

preparing Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, 144 they
solicited former Scalia clerks for suggestions of cases to illustrate
their approach to statutory interpretation. I immediately shot back:
Zuni Public School Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Education. Now you know

why.
III. "IT'S THE SAME OLD STORY, IT'S THE SAME OLD DREAM. IT'S
POWER MAN, POWER MAN, AND ALL THAT IT CAN

BRING" 145
Justice Scalia's most famous majority opinion is surely District of
Columbia v. Heller,146 which recognized that the Second Amendment
guarantees against the federal government an individual right to
possess firearms. 147 However, when asked a few years ago to name
his most important majority opinion, I came up with a different
answer: Crawford v. Washington,148 which reformed case law under
the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause1 49 to bring the case law
in line with a plausible reading of the constitutional text.1 50 I describe
at some length elsewhere the doctrinal and methodological
significance of Crawford,151 and the case is appropriately excerpted in

144 Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TExTs (2012).
145 THE KINKS, Powerman, LOLA VERSUS POWERMAN AND THE MONEYGOROUND, PART

ONE (Reprise 1970).
746 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
747 The Court later extended that doctrine to include a right against the States under

the Fourteenth Amendment. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
148 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
149 U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . .. to be confronted with the witnesses against him").
150 As is explained below, the case law before Crawford bore no plausible
relationship to the text of the Sixth Amendment. See Gary Lawson, Confronting
Crawford: Justice Scalia, the JudicialMethod, and the Adjudicative Limits of Originalism,84
U. CHI. L. REV. 2265, 2274-76 (2017).
151 See id.
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The Essential Scalia.152 But for the present essay, I want to look at one

of Crawford's many lesser-known sequels: Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts.15 3 In some ways, Melendez-Diaz provides perhaps the
clearest window into Justice Scalia's theory of judicial role, and it
helps identify some ambiguities in terms like "conservative" that

bedevil many commentators from a wide range of perspectives. It
was never a plausible candidate for inclusion in a "greatest hits"
volume, because it contains no Scalia-esque rhetorical flourishes, and
the case's jurisprudential implications are very much beneath the
surface. But when one looks carefully at the case, one finds-to mix
Disney metaphors - that there is a whole new world under the sea.
The Sixth Amendment prescribes: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the
witnesses against him .... "154 If one person, or a document or
recording of some kind, relates in court what someone said out of
court that tends to incriminate a criminal defendant, does thatmake
the person who does not actually appear in court to make .their
statement a "witness[] against" the defendant? Has the defendant
been able to "confront" that someone, who testifies in the trial only
in the shadow-like form of their hearsay statement? These are the
questions rather plainly and directly posed by the text of the
Confrontation Clause.
For most of the United States' first two centuries, those questions
were not seriously posed in court, because the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause was a non-player in the constitutional world
and thus was not a noteworthy object of interpretation. Federal
criminal prosecutions were a rare event (hence the phrase, well
known to those of my generation, "don't make a federal case out of
it"), so few occasions arose even to ask what kinds of out-of-court
statements used as evidence in those prosecutions might implicate a
defendant's right to confront witnesses. The overwhelming majority

Scalia, supra note 4, at 215-19.
U.S. 305 (2009).
7s4 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
152 See

133557
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of criminal prosecutions were state prosecutions, and for the 194
years after the ratification of the Sixth Amendment, the
Confrontation Clause was understood not to apply to the States. It is
fair to say that until the middle of the twentieth century, there was
no body of case law that merited the label "Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence."
In 1965, the Supreme Court "incorporated" the Sixth
Amendment confrontation right against the States.1 55 Combined with
the increasing federalization of crime, the post-1965 era saw a
dramatic rise in the number of Confrontation Clause cases facing the
federal courts. 156 Fifteen years later, in Ohio v. Roberts,157 the Supreme
Court put an end - at least temporarily -to most of that litigation by

declaring:
[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for crossexamination at trial, ... his statement is admissible only if it
bears adequate "indicia of reliability." Reliability can be
inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the

evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 158
While this sounds like the work of a legislative committee drafting a

statutory evidence code, it was presented by the Court as an account
(I cannot bring myself to use the word "interpretation") of the Sixth

155 See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
lsa See Lawson, supra note 12, at 2275 n.41 ("A simple search of the [WESTLAW]
federal-courts database for 'confronted /2 witnesses' shows 115 hits for all time before
1965 and 114 hits from 1965 to 1980. A search for 'confrontation clause,' a term that
does not appear to have been in much use in premodern times, yields 477 hits for 1965
to 1980.").
157448 U.S. 56 (1980).
158 Id. at 66.
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Amendment. 159 This account of the Confrontation Clause asked
neither of the two questions posed by the clause's text. Instead, it
asked the non-textual policy question whether the evidence offered
by the prosecution is, in the judgment of the Court, reliable enough
160
with reliability determined largely by
to be used in a criminal tria,
reference to non-constitutional evidence law.
A quarter century after Roberts, the Supreme Court started asking
the questions actually made relevant by the Confrontation Clause. As
Justice Scalia explained in Crawford:
To be sure, the [Confrontation] Clause's ultimate goal is to
ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather
than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence
be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular
manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. The
Clause thus reflects a judgment, not only about the
desirability of reliable evidence (a point on which there could
be little dissent), but about how reliability can best be

determined. 161

As I have elsewhere summarized the substance of the Court's position in

159

Roberts:
In other words: If evidence was admitted by virtue of a hearsay exception

that the justices on the Court circa 1980 would have learned about in law
school half a century earlier, it automatically counts as "reliable" and its
admission therefore does not violate the Confrontation Clause. If it is
admitted pursuant to some newfangled hearsay exception (for example, the

"catch-all" exception represented by Federal Rule of Evidence 807 and
included in some state rules of evidence), then the Court will decide case by
case whether the evidence is sufficiently reliable to be admitted over a
Confrontation Clause exception. In all instances, the clause is read to exclude
unreliable or untrustworthy evidence and nothing more.
Lawson, supra note 12, at 2275-76.
160 To be sure, that policy question could, in principle, potentially find constitutional

footing in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' due process of law clauses in certain
cases. But the application of any such due-process-of-law principle would be casespecific rather than general, and there is no chance that the applications would track
the vagaries of non-constitutional evidence law.
161

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty

222

New York University Journal of Law & Liberty

[Vol. 15:169

Crawford thus rejected the Roberts framework in favor of an approach
that asks (1) whether the person whose statement is used against a
defendant is a "witness" within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment

and, if so, (2) whether that "witness" was "confronted" by the
defendant. People are witnesses under the Sixth Amendment, said
the Court in Crawford, if they
"bear testimony." "Testimony," in turn, is typically "[a]
solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of
establishing or proving some fact." An accuser who makes a
formal statement to government officers bears testimony in
a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an
acquaintance does not.162
(The quoted definition of "testimony" came from Noah Webster's
1828 dictionary.) Once someone is identified as a witness,

confrontation requires that the person appear in court to be crossexamined if they are available to appear. If they are not available,
with the concept of unavailability essentially tracking the definition
that applies under non-constitutional evidence law, 163 their
statement cannot be used as evidence of its truth against the
defendant unless there was some prior opportunity for the defendant
to cross-examine the witness -as could happen, for example, if the
declarant died but gave testimony subject to cross-examination by
the defendant at a previous trial or deposition. 164
Once the Court settled on the Crawford framework, further
questions immediately arose about what kinds of statements counted
as "testimony" that would make the declarants of those statements

162

Id. at 51 (citations omitted).

See FED. R. EviD. 804(a) (defining witnesses as unavailable if they successfully
invoke a privilege, refuse to testify even when threatened with contempt, testify to
163

being unable to remember the subject matter of their statement, are dead or ill, or

cannot be located to be subpoenaed).
164 See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
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constitutional "witnesses." Two years after Crawford (which is almost
immediately in Supreme Court time), the Court addressed some of

these issues in the companion cases of Davis v. Washington and
Hammon v. Indiana, 165 which distinguished calls for help (not
testimonial so not constitutional witnessing) from statements
designed primarily to establish or prove past facts (testimonial so
constitutional witnessing). The Court also established, in Giles v.
California, 166 that it is possible for a defendant to forfeit the
constitutional confrontation right by wrongfully preventing a
declarant from appearing in court, but only if the defendant intends
to render the declarant unavailable to testify (so that if you
accidentally run over the declarant with your truck, that does not
count as forfeiting your confrontation right).
All three of the majority opinions in these post-Crawford cases
that fleshed out the Court's new Confrontation Clause framework
were written by Justice Scalia. Giles, which concerned a somewhat
arcane question with relatively few applications, was 6-3, with a twoJustice concurrence, but Davis and Hammon, which were the Court's
first efforts to clarify the key contours of the Crawford framework,
were close to unanimous. The only separate opinion came from
Justice Thomas, who agreed in broad principle with Crawford's
framing of the relevant questions but thought that the category of
constitutional "witnesses" was narrower than the majority's and
included only statements that have a level of formality and solemnity
167
greater than, for example, on-the-scene police interrogations.
Justice Scalia also wrote the majority opinion in Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts,168 the Court's fourth sequel to Crawford. But this time

165 547 U.S. 813 (2006).

166554 U.S. 353 (2008).
167 See Hammon, 547 U.S. at 836-37 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part). In Crawford, the police conducted a recorded interview in the

police station. In Hammon, the police interviewed a suspected crime victim in her home
after responding to a report of a domestic disturbance. Justice Thomas considered the
statements in Crawford but not the statements in Hammon to be testimonial statements
subject to the Confrontation Clause.

168 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
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the Court fractured 5-4, leaving a split that has not been formally
resolved to this day. That doctrinal split, while of considerable
significance to the administration of criminal justice, is less important
than the jurisprudential split that generated it.
Luis Melendez-Diaz and Thomas Wright were arrested and
found to be in possession of some plastic bags filled with a substance
resembling cocaine. The bags were submitted to a Massachusetts
crime lab for analysis, and the lab produced a sworn, notarized report
declaring the contents of the bags to be cocaine. 169 Melendez-Diaz

was tried and convicted of cocaine distribution and trafficking. The
Massachusetts courts rejected his claim that use of the lab reports
violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause.17 0
For Justice Scalia and a majority of the Court, this was a very easy
case:
There is little doubt that the documents at issue in this case
fall within the "core class of testimonial statements" .... The
documents
at issue
here, while denominated
by
Massachusetts law "certificates," are quite plainly affidavits:
"declaration[s] of facts written down and sworn to by the
declarant before an officer authorized to administer oaths."

"

Black's Law Dictionary 62 (8th ed. 2004). They are
incontrovertibly a " 'solemn declaration or affirmation made
for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.'
Crawford, supra, at 51 (quoting 2 N. Webster, An American

Dictionary of the English Language (1828)). The fact in
question is that the substance found in the possession of
Melendez-Diaz

169

and

his

codefendants

was,

as

the

See id. at 307-08.

170 The statements in the lab report describing the test results were obviously

hearsay, but they were admissible under state evidence law by virtue of a nowrepealed statute declaring them admissible.
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prosecution claimed, cocaine - the precise testimony the
analysts would be expected to provide if called at trial ....
Here, moreover, not only were the affidavits " 'made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available
for use at a later trial, " Crawford, supra, at 52, but under
Massachusetts law the sole purpose of the affidavits was to
provide "prima facie evidence of the composition, quality,
and the net weight" of the analyzed substance, Mass. Gen.
Laws, ch. 111, § 13. We can safely assume that the analysts
were aware of the affidavits' evidentiary purpose, since that
purpose - as stated in the relevant state-law provision - was
reprinted on the affidavits themselves.
In short, under our decision in Crawford the analysts'
affidavits were testimonial statements, and the analysts were
"witnesses" for purposes of the Sixth Amendment. Absent a
showing that the analysts were unavailable to testify at trial
and that petitioner had a prior opportunity to cross-examine
them, petitioner was entitled to " 'be confronted with' " the
17
analysts at trial.

Apart from a few repetitive or clarifying sentences, which I
deleted, that was the entirety of the majority's reasoning in MelendezDiaz; everything else was a response to the dissent. Nor was anything
else necessary for "this rather straightforward application of our
72
holding in Crawford."1 As Justice Thomas pointed out in his brief
concurring opinion, 173 affidavits-or sworn certificates that are
functionally the same as affidavits - are obviously testimonial
statements, and the makers of affidavits are obviously constitutional
"witnesses against" defendants when the affidavits are used by the
prosecution in criminal trials. Who could possibly think otherwise?

Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310-11 (citations omitted).
Id. at 312.
173 See id. at 329-30 (Thomas, J., concurring).
171

172
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Four justices. Justice Kennedy wrote a biting dissenting opinion,
joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Breyer, and Justice Alito, that
drew a sharp distinction "between laboratory analysts who perform
scientific tests and other, more conventional witnesses ... ."174 The
Court, said the dissent, is generating "formalistic and wooden rules,
divorced from precedent, common sense, and the underlying
purpose of the Clause . .. [with] vast potential to disrupt criminal
procedures that already give ample protections against the misuse of
scientific evidence." 175 The result is "to disrupt if not end many
prosecutions where guilt is clear but a newly found formalism now

holds sway." 176
The dissent spent much energy describing the likely
consequences of the Court's opinion177 and exploring how applying
the Confrontation Clause to producers of scientific evidence will not
serve the supposed purposes of the clause. 178 But, as the dissent itself
notes, "[a]ll of the problems with today's decision ... would be of no
moment if the Constitution did, in fact, require the Court to rule as it
does today." 179 So why would the Constitution not require
confrontation of persons who produce forensic evidence against
defendants? Because, according to the dissent, such persons are not
really "witnesses against" the defendant. The dissent maintained that
a witness -or, rather, what it called a "typical witness" -is "one who
perceived an event that gave rise to a personal belief in some aspect
of the defendant's guilt."180 Laboratory analysts perceive and report
events, such as test results, but they do not generally formulate

174 Id. at 330 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
175 Id. at 331-32.
176

Id. at 333.

177 See, e.g., id. at 341 ("the Court imposes enormous costs on the administration of

justice"); id. at 342 ("Guilty defendants will go free, on the most technical grounds, as
a direct result of today's decision, adding nothing to the truth-finding process.").
178 See, e.g., id. at 338-40.
179 Id. at 343.
180 Id. at 344.
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personal beliefs about the defendant. They may not even know to
whom the tests they perform pertain. Thus, said Justice Kennedy, the
Court need not treat them as witnesses subject to the Confrontation
Clause.
That is the only textual, non-policy-based argument produced by
the dissent. And, it is a really lousy argument. Suppose that Congress
passes a statute allowing the prosecution, if it thinks it will be an
effective trial strategy, to bring in forensic analysts to testify in court

at criminal trials without any opportunityat trialfor the defense to cross-

-

examine those analysts. The analyst in court is reciting the same
information that would be recited in a written report. Is that statute
constitutional? Obviously yes, on the dissent's view, because the
Confrontation Clause only applies to "witnesses," and if witnesses
only include people with personal views about the application of
their evidence to specific defendants, the analyst will not count as
one, even if the analyst appears in court. The sheer applesauce of this
constitutional interpretation should be obvious. Anyone who
provides the government an account of events that the prosecution
uses to help convict a defendant is obviously a "witness[] against"
the defendant, whether or not they know that their account of events
181
People who provide the
specifically implicates the defendant.
government statements that are solemn and formal enough to count
as testimony under Crawford know that they are potentially
incriminating someone even if they do not specifically know who that
someone might be. The notion that the Constitution refers only to a
subset of the universe of such people is pretty obviously contrived
which is no doubt why the dissent spent the vast bulk of its energy
on the perceived consequences of applying the Confrontation Clause
to providers of forensic evidence.

181 Does that mean that

clerks who certify copies of official documents introduced

against defendants are constitutional "witnesses"? See id. at 347-48. Justice Scalia tried
to dismiss this example as a narrow historical anomaly involving authentication rather

than creation of a record, but it is hard to see why someone who authenticates a piece
of evidence necessary for the prosecution's case is not a "witness[] against" the

defendant. See id. at 322-23 (majority opinion). Score one for the dissent.
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Those consequences would widely be viewed as - with apologies
to Justice Breyer -"conservative." They include overturning widely

accepted practices and precedents,18 2 generating uncertainty about
the law, 183 and, most prominently, letting obviously guilty criminals
go free on technicalities.1 84 Concerns for tradition, certainty, stability,
and law and order are well-nigh constitutive of at least some
conceptions of what it means to be a legal "conservative."
Justice Scalia was certainly a fan of tradition, certainty, stability,

and law and order. But, he was also a fan of the Constitution. What
happens when those commitments conflict?
On some occasions, Justice Scalia chose what might be called

rule-of-law values over the Constitution, as Steve Calabresi and I
have detailed (and critiqued) elsewhere. 185 But, in general, Justice
Scalia was more inclined than the typical judge to view the
Constitution as hierarchically superior to other perceived values.
That is certainly true in the case of the "conservative" Justice
Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts, and less certainly but still
arguably true in the case of the "conservative" Justice Alito. (It is
trivially true of Justice Breyer, who no one would call "conservative"
by any plausible criteria.) This highlights a crucial ambiguity in what

it means to be a "conservative" judge.

12 See id. at 330 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The Court sweeps away an accepted rule
governing the admission of scientific evidence . . [that] extends across at least 35
States and six Federal Courts of Appeals.").
18 See id. at 331 ("The Court dictates ... as a matter of constitutional law, an as-yetundefined set of rules governing what kinds of evidence may be admitted without incourt testimony.... Now, without guidance from any established body of law, the
States can only guess what future rules this Court will distill from the sparse
constitutional text.").
18 See id. at 342 ("Guilty defendants will go free, on the most technical grounds, as
a direct result of today's decision, adding nothing to the truth-finding process."). See
also id. at 333 (applying confrontation rights to laboratory personnel "threatens to

disrupt if not end many prosecutions where guilt is clear but a newly found formalism
now holds sway."); id. at 336-38.
15 See Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Rule of Law as a Law of Law, 90 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 483 (2015).
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One possible meaning of a "conservative" judge is someone who,
in accordance with some version of the attitudinal model of
judging,186 consistently reaches outcomes that are consistent with a
policy program that is either conventionally labeled "conservative"
or would be endorsed by some number of people who self-identify
as "conservative." In the context of Melendez-Diaz, a legal rule that
frees guilty criminals in the name of procedural formalities that
almost never make a difference would likely not appeal to a

"conservative" judge in this sense.
A second possible meaning of "conservative" focuses less on
outcomes and more on judicial philosophy. A "conservative" judge
might be associated with some notion of "judicial restraint," in which
judges should only rarely and reluctantly call into question the legal
validity of executive or legislative action, by utilizing something like
James Bradley Thayer's precept that courts "can only disregard the
Act when those who have the right to make laws have not merely
made a mistake, but have made a very clear one - so clear that is not
open to rational question." 187 Judges on this model are
"conservative" when they do very little. A decision revolutionizing
trial practices more than two centuries after the founding would
likely not find favor with "conservatives" of this stripe.188

186 Attitudinal models hypothesize "that justices decide cases on the basis of their

personal attitudes about social policy and not on the basis of any genuine fidelity to
law." Michael J. Gerhardt, Book Review, Attitudes about Attitudes, 101 MICH. L. REV.
1733, 1733 (2003). There is a variety of such models. Lee Epstein, Some Thoughts on the
Study of Judicial Behavior, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2017 (2016). They obviously have
some non-trivial measure of predictive value or they would not have survived this

long, but an assessment of any or all of those models is beyond my pay grade.
187 James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893). For critiques of Thayerianism, see
Steven G. Calabresi, Originalism and James Bradley Thayer, 113 Nw. U.L. REV. 1419
(2019); Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional
Interpretation,81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1274-79 (1996).
188 Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor did not join the majority
opinion in Crawford and would have decided the case without overruling Ohio v.
Roberts. See 541 U.S. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) ("I believe that
the Court's adoption of a new interpretation of the Confrontation Clause is not backed
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A third possible meaning of "conservative" in the legal context
"is someone who believes in a variant of original meaning for
interpreting constitutions and statutes and who views the common

law as a device for securing social coordination within a spontaneous
order - all overlaid with a strong respect for the Anglo-American,
Rule of Law tradition." 189 Because the original meaning of the
Constitution rather plainly sets the Constitution above competing
sources of law, 19 0 a judge who is "conservative" in this sense is
probably better described as constitutionalist, for the Constitution

prevails over either preferred policy outcomes or conceptions of the
judicial role that are not themselves grounded in the Constitution. For a
constitutionalist judge, if ideal law consists of clear rules but the

Constitution prescribes mushy standards, too bad for ideal law.
Similarly, if good social order requires swift and sure punishment for
criminals,

but the Constitution puts wooden

and formalistic

roadblocks in the path of prosecutors, too bad for good social order.
Justice Scalia's opinions in Crawford and Melendez-Diaz were
constitutionalist, but not judicially "conservative" in either of the first
two senses of that term noted above. Justice Kennedy's dissent in
Melendez-Diaz was conservative in both of the first two senses, but it
was not constitutionalist. By the same token, Justice Scalia's
consistent refusal to enforce the constitutional non-subdelegation
doctrine 191 was not conservative in the first sense, was conservative
in the second sense, but was not constitutionalist and therefore not

conservative in the third sense. His insistence that governmental

by sufficiently persuasive reasoning to overrule long-established precedent. Its
decision casts a mantle of uncertainty over future criminal trials in both federal and
state courts, and is by no means necessary to decide the present case.").
189 Gary Lawson, Conservative or Constitutionalist?,1 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 81, 81

(2002).
190 See Gary Lawson, Rebel Without a Clause: The Irrelevance of Article VI to
ConstitutionalSupremacy, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 33, 36-38 (2011).
191 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 415-15 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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policies that take account of race are always and everywhere
unconstitutional because the Constitution demands colorblindness 192 is conservative in the first sense, not conservative in the
second sense, and probably not conservative/constitutionalist in the
third sense. 193
The point is not to argue that Justice Scalia was purely
inconsistent. He was inconsistent to a point, but less so than are many
in this business. 194 The point is only that the term "legal
conservative" or "judicial conservative" is ambiguous. It can mean
different things to different people at different times. The ongoing
195
is a stark
saga of Melendez-Diaz and the Confrontation Clause
reminder of this.
Why does it matter? Partly it matters because clear
communication is a good thing, and keeping clear how one uses
potentially equivocal terms like "conservative" is therefore
intellectually important. And, partly it matters because, in

192

See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 397, 315 (2013) (Scalia, J.,

concurring) ("I adhere to the view I expressed in Grutter v. Bollinger: 'The Constitution
proscribes government discrimination on the basis of race, and state-provided

education is no exception."' (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349 (2003)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part))).
193 I doubt whether the fiduciary principle that validly generates a doctrine of
"federal equal protection" requires strict color-blindness by the federal government.
See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, "A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY": UNDERSTANDING
THE FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION 166-67 (2017). I am less confident about the appropriate
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism

and the ColorblindConstitution, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 71, 74-77 (2013).
194 And even the best artists are sometimes inconsistent. The Bruce Springsteen who

produced the magnificent The River followed it up with the unlistenable Nebraska.
195 Two years after Melendez-Diaz, the four dissenting justices in that case wrote:
"Seven years after its initiation, it bears remembering that the Crawford approach was

not preordained." Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 684 (2011) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). The same four justices sought sharply to limit the scope of Melendez-Diaz
in Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012) (plurality opinion), in which they let the
government do an end-run around Melendez-Diaz by having expert witnesses testify
based on hearsay statements in DNA reports rather than introduce those statements

directly. Justice Thomas provided the fifth vote to send Williams to prison on the
ground that the DNA reports, produced by a private lab, were not sufficiently formal
or solemn to be testimonial. See id. at 102 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
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it means to be a

"conservative" judge entail different allocations of governmental
power.
A constitutionalist judge puts power in the hands of the
Constitution. That choice can take away power from the judge who
prefers an outcome different from the one prescribed by the
Constitution. It can also take power away from executives and
legislators-perhaps to a significantly greater extent than would be
considered desirable by a Thayerian "conservative" judge.
Constitutionalism and judicial restraint sometimes go together and
sometimes do not; that is an empirical question that depends on the
actual meaning of the Constitution in various contexts. Thayerian
conservatism and constitutionalism are both less empowering of
judges than an attitudinal conservatism, which essentially tells

judges to reach politically pleasing outcomes (such as not letting
guilty crooks go free on technicalities).
The debate in Melendez-Diaz (and the subsequent Confrontation
Clause cases) between Justice Scalia and Thomas on the one hand 196
and the other "conservative" justices on the other says a great deal
about the meaning of modern "conservative" legal thought. It
highlights why, in order to understand some of the most important
currents in modern law, one needs the essential Scalia - and The

Essential Scalia.

1 Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas had their own internal debate about how
broadly or narrowly to understand what it means to be a constitutional "witness[],"
but that debate is less significant than the larger debate between the two of them and
the other "conservative" justices about the basic framework for thinking about
confrontation.
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